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Value Pluralism and Liberal Democracy 
Yao Lin 
 
As the title indicates, this three-essay dissertation explores the relations between value 
pluralism and liberal democracy. 
The first essay, “Negative versus Positive Freedom: Making Sense of the 
Dichotomy,” starts with the puzzling appeal of the n gative-versus-positive-freedom 
dichotomy. Why has this distinction, despite forceful criticisms against it, continued to 
dominate mainstream discourses on freedom in contemporary political theory? Does it 
grasp something fundamental about the phenomenology f freedom? 
In this essay I examine four main approaches to making sense of the appeal of this 
dichotomy, and the challenges they each face. Both the conventional, naive contrast 
between “freedom from” and “freedom to,” and the revisionist strategy to distinguish 
between the “opportunity-concept” and the “exercise-concept” of freedom, upon close 
scrutiny, fail to survive MacCallum’s triadic argument against all dichotomous views on 
the concept of freedom. The third account, which reduc  the negative/positive 
 
 
dichotomy of freedom to the divide between “phenomenal” and “nounemal” 
conceptions of the self, or of the range of preventing conditions, is both interpretively 
misleading and conceptually uninformative, as I illustrate by using Berlin’s discussion 
on self-abnegation as an example. In the fourth place, I analyze why both the historical 
bifurcation account that take the negative/positive dichotomy of freedom as merely 
genealogical, on the one hand, and the republican critique of it based on the presumably 
sublating conception of non-domination, on the other hand, are unsatisfying. 
Finally, I argue that grounding the negative/positive dichotomy of freedom on the 
idea of value pluralism avoids the pitfalls of those approaches examined. According to 
this account, the dichotomized instantiation of freedom is necessary insofar as we live 
not in isolation but with other moral agents. The “n gative” freedom instantiated in the 
access to an extensive sphere of permissible choices and actions, and the “positive” 
freedom instantiated in the access to collective decision-making and democratic self-
government, reflect two equally genuine yet incommensurable modes of freedom as a 
basic value. 
Many believe that value pluralism and liberalism are ultimately incompatible, 
however, since liberalism implies the prioritization f liberal values over other basic 
values, which is contradictory to the value pluralist idea that all basic values are equally 
 
 
genuine and incommensurable. The next two essays take up this challenge, arguing on 
the contrary that a persuasively elaborated version of value pluralism is not only 
compatible with liberal commitments, but can also pr vide distinctive grounds for 
liberal democracy and have significant political implications. 
In the second essay, “Value Pluralism and Its Compatibility with Liberalism,” I 
explain the methodology of my argument, elaborate thr e key concepts underlying value 
pluralism – value objectivity, value incompatibility, and value incommensurability – 
and then develop an account of modal heterogeneity of value instantiation, as opposed 
to valuative hierarchy. Whereas valuative hierarchy is in tension with value 
incommensurability, the idea of modal heterogeneity allows that different values have 
different modes of instantiation that warrant differentiated prioritization of certain 
values in relevant practical contexts, without implying anything about the comparative 
moral worth of relevant values. I use a mathematical analogy to illustrate the modal 
heterogeneity of value instantiation, as well as how we may accord freedom a special 
institutional role on the basis of its modal specialty vis-à-vis other basic values, 
rendering liberalism compatible with value pluralism. 
The argument is completed in the third essay, “Value Pluralism, Liberal 
Democracy, and Political Judgment,” where I compare my account based on the idea of 
 
 
modal heterogeneity, developed in the second essay, with three existing versions of 
liberal pluralism. Whereas Berlin’s argument from choice, Crowder’s proposal of 
pluralist virtues, and Galston’s presumption of expr ssive liberty all fail to pass either 
the Jump Test or the Trump Test, my modal account overc mes these two basic 
difficulties faced by liberal pluralism. 
The rest of the essay discusses three main political implications of the modal 
account of liberal pluralism. First, it helps us better understand the nature of 
demarcating and overstepping the so-called “frontiers” of a “negative” area of 
permissible choices and actions free from interference, or put another way, of balancing 
the protection of civil liberties and rights, on the one hand, with the procurement of 
certain important social goods through policies, on the other hand. Second, the modal 
account entails the dichotomization argument for democracy, and as a consequence 
supports not only liberalism, but liberal democracy. Recognizing the tension between 
negative and positive modes of freedom as immanent to he dynamic of liberal 
democracy, value pluralists nonetheless have reason to cherish, rather than to decry, 
such dynamic. Third, the modal account also suggests we appreciate the contentious yet 
indispensible role of political judgment in democratic life, and attend to the normative 
theorizing of its implications. On the one hand, it recommends institutional designs that 
 
 
diversify forms of political decision-making, such as by introducing adequate 
mechanisms of checks and balances and establishing relevant sites of expertise. On the 
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Negative versus Positive Freedom 
Making Sense of the Dichotomy 
 
The negative/positive distinction of freedom seems to have a somewhat paradoxical 
status in contemporary political theory.1 On the one hand, after Isaiah Berlin’s famous 
lecture, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” 2 had sparked a heated debate about the meaning of 
freedom at the outset of the Cold War, few prominent political theorists have fully 
committed to this dichotomy (or at least to Berlin’s version of it), and in fact many 
forceful criticisms, both conceptual and normative, have been advanced against it. On 
the other hand, it seems that, in spite of sustained critique and resistance, the vocabulary 
of negative-versus-positive freedom has continued to ominate mainstream talks about 
                                                          
1 Except as otherwise noted, in this essay I will use “freedom” and “liberty” interchangeably. 
But see Hanna Pitkin (1988) for a reminder on the historically nuanced differences in meaning 
between these two English terms. 
2 For the sake of convenience, hereafter in this essay I will refer to “Two Concepts of Liberty” 
(Berlin 2007b, written in 1958) as TCL, and Berlin’s later “Introduction to Four Essays on 
Liberty” (Berlin 2007a, written in 1969) as I. 
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political and social freedom. This seems to suggest that there is something intuitively 
appealing about the dichotomy. What exactly, one might wonder, is its appeal? Does 
this distinction grasp, say, something fundamental about the phenomenology of freedom? 
In this essay I scrutinize four main approaches to making sense of the 
negative/positive dichotomy, and propose an alternaive account of it. The first section 
overviews the common, naive contrast between “freedom from” and “freedom to,” and 
introduces MacCallum’s triadic argument against all dichotomous views on the concept 
of freedom. I then look at the revisionist strategy to distinguish between the 
“opportunity-concept” and the “exercise-concept” of freedom, only to find it 
unsustainable. Thirdly, I turn to the idea that thenegative/positive typology could be 
seen as reflecting the contrast between two conceptions of the self, or between two 
views on the range of preventing conditions. Using the widespread misinterpretation of 
Berlin’s discussion on self-abnegation as an example, I illustrate why the idea 
mentioned above is problematic. The fourth section discusses both the “historical 
bifurcation” account of the negative/positive dichotomy as reflecting two salient 
intellectual traditions motivated by different questions about freedom, and the 




Finally, I argue that grounding the negative/positive dichotomy of freedom on the 
idea of value pluralism avoids the pitfalls of those approaches examined. According to 
this account, the “negative” freedom instantiated in the access to an extensive sphere of 
permissible choices and actions, and the “positive” fr edom instantiated in the access to 
collective decision-making and democratic self-government, reflect two equally genuine 
yet incommensurable value-modes of freedom. No reconciliation between them can be 
achieved conceptually. Their tradeoff has to be made in practice, subject to ongoing 
debates and judgments. 
 
Dichotomy or Triadicity: MacCallum’s Challenge 
 
A common-or-garden understanding of the negative/positive dichotomy is invited by the 
very way of its naming. Accordingly, negative freedom, insofar as it is negative, refers 
to the absence of something, whereas positive freedom, insofar as it is positive, refers to 
the presence of something. Put another way, negative freedom is the freedom from X, 
where X ranges over constraints, restrictions, interferences, or other kinds of preventing 
conditions. By contrast, positive freedom is the freedom to (do or become) Y, whereas Y 
ranges over actions, ends, conditions of character or environment, or other objectives 
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that would be realized along with the acquisition of such freedom. In his writings on 
freedom, Berlin sometimes succumbed to this common-or-garden account, widespread 
at his day, equating negative freedom with “freedom from” and positive freedom with 
“freedom to” (cf. TCL 178).3 
Gerald MacCallum (1967), however, offered a seminal rebuttal to this distinction 
between freedom as the absence of something and free om as the presence of something. 
According to MacCallum, both “freedom from” and “freedom to” are merely shortcut 
uses, in given contexts of discussion, of the only, full concept of freedom, which must 
always be understood as a triadic relation between certain agent A, certain preventing 
condition X, which must be absent, and certain objective Y, which must be present. 
Freedom, in other words, is always the freedom of A from X to (do or become) Y. As a 
consequence, there can be no such things as “negativ ” and “positive” concepts of 
freedom, as Berlin had them, but only different conceptions of freedom, disagreeing 
with one another over the ranges of the three term variables – A, X, and Y – within the 
same basic, triadic concept. 
                                                          
3 Joshua Cherniss (2013: 145-151) nicely summarized th  history of employing “negative” and 




Berlin was unimpressed by MacCallum’s conceptual critique at the time, and 
replied summarily in a footnote: “A man struggling a ainst his chains or a people 
against enslavement need not consciously aim at any definite further state. A man need 
not know how he will use his freedom; he just wants to remove the yoke. So do classes 
and nations.” The possibility of lacking any conscious and definite aim while free (or 
while pursuing freedom), Berlin believed, indicates that the presence of certain 
objective (i.e. “to Y”) is not a necessary component for the negative concept of freedom, 
and therefore that it is “an error” to understand freedom as a relation of irreducible 
triadicity (I 36, n.1). 
But this reply rests on a confusion between the lack of a conscious and definite aim, 
on the one hand, and the lack of any kind of objectiv , on the other hand. As a result, it 
fails to notice that the fact that agent A may not know exactly how she will use her 
freedom after acquiring it does not imply that this freedom can be construed simply as a 
dyadic relation between agents and preventing conditi s, without reference to 
objectives. For the term variable Y in the triadic concept of freedom does not, as Berlin 
suggested, range merely over “any definite further state” that A would “consciously aim 
at.” Quite to the contrary, it may also range over unwittingly endorsed ends as well as 
vaguely described further states of affairs, such as “(to) fulfill whatever desires A 
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actually has,” “(to) do whatever A would rationally choose to do,” and so on. Only by 
omitting, given the context of the discussion, any reference to objectives of this kind 
can we have the purely negative construal of “(A’s) freedom from X,” which therefore 
must be seen not as a self-sufficient dyadic concept, but only as an incomplete rendering 
of the more basic, triadic concept. 
MacCallum’s triadicity argument is devastating to the conventional view that 
negative freedom is the absence of something while positive freedom is the presence of 
something. It also poses a serious challenge to the negative/positive dichotomy itself. 
For if MacCallum is right that all conceptions of freedom are premised on one and the 
same basic concept, how can we meaningfully group them into two, rather than any 
other number of, conceptual categories? 
 
Opportunity versus Exercise? 
 
One prominent approach in response to this challenge, proposed by Charles Taylor 
(1979) and endorsed by a large group of theorists (cf. Baldwin 1984; Skinner 2001; 
Christman 2005), is to distinguish between the “opportunity-concept” and the “exercise-
concept” of freedom. On the one hand, advocates of this distinction acknowledge that 
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neither “(A’s) freedom from X” nor “(A’s) freedom to Y” suffices to constitute a 
distinctive concept of freedom, and that both could be subsumed by MacCallum’s 
triadic schema, “(A’s) freedom from X to Y.” On the other hand, they maintain that not 
all types of freedom can be characterized in the MacCallumite way. 
This is so because, they argue, the notion of freedom (from X) to Y is essentially an 
“opportunity-concept” of freedom, according to whic an agent A is free insofar as the 
barriers against A to (do or become) Y have all been removed, such that the opportunity 
to (do or become) Y is fully open to A. But this concept, goes the argument, cannot 
capture another important sense in which A is free: namely, A is free only when she is 
actually Y-ing (or, actually doing or becoming Y), rather than whenever she has been 
presented with the opportunity to (do or become) Y, regardless of whether she actually 
exercises such opportunity.4  This “exercise-concept” of freedom is, it is argued, 
                                                          
4 It might be argued that the “opportunity-concept” camp can be further divided, if we take 
“opportunities” to be the xternal enabling factors for the exercise of freedom, and “abilities” to 
be the internal enabling factors for it. For example, a poor student who is taking an exam 
presumably has the opportunity but not the ability to get an A+ for the course, whereas a good 
student may have the ability to get an A+ but may be deprived of the opportunity to do so, when 
some incident or interference prevents her from taking that exam. Moreover, both the notion of 
freedom as the presence of external opportunities, and that of freedom as the presence of 
internal abilities, the argument goes, fall short of actual exercises. Indeed, Amartya Sen’s 
“capabilities approach” is presumably an exemplar of embracing a non-exercise-concept of 
freedom that incorporates both external-opportunity and internal-ability considerations (cf. Sen 
1992: 20). If this is the case, it seems that we could simply equate the negative/positive 
dichotomy of freedom with the external/internal dichotomy of enabling (and/or constraining) 
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conceptually distinct from the “opportunity-concept” of freedom expressible by the 
MacCallumite schema of “(A’s) freedom (from X) to Y”: for, in contrast to the 
opportunity-concept of freedom to (do or become) Y, the exercise-concept consists 
instead in the peculiar idea of freedom as Y-ing (or, as doing or becoming Y).5 
If this is the case, then it is perfectly reasonable to conclude that the intuitive 
appeal of the conventional vocabulary of negative-versus-positive freedom lies in its 
affinity with the genuine conceptual distinction betw en freedom as opportunity, on the 
one hand, and freedom as exercise, on the other hand. Despite MacCallum’s argument 
against the distinction between “freedom from” and “freedom to,” we have reason to 
retain the use of the negative/positive dichotomy of freedom, albeit by locating it in a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
factors, without having to introduce a controversial, distinct concept of freedom, i.e. the 
exercise-concept, in order to make sense of the former dichotomy. I address this external-
versus-internal argument in footnote 9 below. 
5  Some have claimed that the exercise-concept of freedom is also different from the 
opportunity-concept in another aspect: whereas the latt r is a triadic relation between agents, 
obstacles and objectives, the former is “a monadic property of agents,” according to which “a 
free agent is one who possesses the appropriate personality – is self-realized, self-actualized, in 
a stage of harmony, rational, autonomous in any one of a number of senses of these notions,” to 
the effect that “[to] be free just is a matter of having a certain kind of character, having certain 
kinds of desires, and so forth,” regardless of whether here are “some assignable obstacles from 
which the person is free” (Swanton 1992: ix, emphasis added). I find this monadic 
characterization obviously mistaken, and mistaken for similar reasons why Berlin’s reply to 
MacCallum, discussed in the previous section, failed. In any case, this issue is peripheral to the 
main arguments of this essay. 
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different place. That is, we should, on the one hand, understand “doctrines of positive 
freedom” as “concerned with a view of freedom which involves essentially the 
exercising of control over one’s life,” according to which “one is free only to the extent 
that one has effectively determined oneself and the shape of one’s life,” and, on the 
other hand, take “negative theories” of freedom to be relying “simply on an opportunity-
concept, where being free in a matter of what we can do, of what it is open to us to do, 
whether or not we do anything to exercise these options” (Taylor 1979: 177). 
There have been at least two kinds of objection to this revisionist approach to the 
dichotomy. The first is that construing freedom in exercise-terms is a disingenuous 
conceptual manipulation. Berlin, for example, repudiated “the identification of freedom 
with activity as such” as “yet another misconception,” and insisted that freedom “is 
opportunity for action, rather than action itself” (I 34-35). This equivalence holds, he 
claimed, not only for what he meant by “negative” freedom, but for “positive” freedom 
as well: 
 
The essence of the notion of liberty, in both the ‘positive’ and the ‘negative’ 
senses, is the holding off of something or someone – of others who trespass on 
my field or assert their authority over me, or of obsessions, fears, neuroses, 





In line with this definition, the very idea of an exercise-concept of freedom would be as 
self-contradictory and meaningless as that of, say, a square-concept of circle. 
Defenders of the exercise-concept have, of course, di missed Berlin’s repudiation 
as merely reflecting the prejudice and insensitivity on the part of “negative theorists,” 
under which he has often been categorized.6 For, in the eyes of Taylor and like-minded 
theorists, there is at least one historically salient conception of freedom, namely, 
freedom as self-realization, which cannot be properly understood without resorting to 
the exercise-concept. According to this self-realization view, one is (truly) free only 
when she has actually realized her “higher self,” is deliberating and acting in 
accordance with moral principles or norms of practical rationality, embodies some state 
of being reflective of a virtuous life, and so on.7 Merely having the opportunity to self-
realization, by contrast, does not make her (truly) free. 
                                                          
6  Such categorization is, in my opinion, uncharitably over-simplified; for it fails to take 
seriously important nuances in Berlin’s thought. I will return to this issue later. 
7 For example, Jon Elster has once defended a revisionist Marxist “conception of the good life 
as one of active self-realization,” where self-realization is defined as “the [not] full [but] free 
actualization and externalization of the powers andthe abilities of the individual” (Elster 1986: 
97, 101). According to this definition, both the actualization of one’s powers and abilities, on 
the one hand, and the freedom of such actualization, on the other hand, are components of self-
realization (cf. Elster [1986: 101]: “Ex ante the individual should be free to choose which of his 
many powers and abilities to develop”; “the choice of a vehicle of self-realization must be 
freely made by the individual”), which suggests that, in Elster’s own view, self-realization is a 
11 
 
Given the fact – which Berlin acknowledged – that the above view has been 
endorsed or at least entertained by many important hinkers throughout history, 
renouncing the exercise-concept as “yet another misconception,” as Berlin did, is prima 
facie an unjustifiable deployment of definitional fiat. Granted, negative theorists might 
offer one reason or another for “declaring all self-r alisation views to be metaphysical 
hogwash” (Taylor 1979: 179). But theorists of self-r alization also may argue, and have 
argued, for the superiority of their views over negative conceptions of freedom. And 
more importantly, this dispute operates at the normative level, not at the conceptual 
level. In other words, even if negative theorists were right that the conception of 
freedom as self-realization is morally and politically detestable, it by no means follows 
that its underlying exercise-concept is not a distinct concept of freedom vis-à-vis the 
opportunity-concept. 
This is, however, where the second line of argument against the exercise-concept 
approach comes in. Here the concern is that, leaving the normative dispute aside, it is 
dubious whether an exercise-concept of freedom, distinct from and irreducible to the 
opportunity-concept, is at all possible. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
higher ideal than freedom and therefore cannot itself be identified with the latter, as exercise-
concept theorists of freedom would have it. 
12 
 
Eric Nelson, for example, has argued that the “putatively ‘positive’ claims about 
freedom are actually claims about the absence of constraint” (Nelson 2005: 65), and that, 
as a consequence, the ostensible disparity between th  so-called “exercise-concept” and 
the “opportunity-concept” of freedom would disappear once we, having accepted the 
MacCallumite formula about freedom, adopt a maximally extensive conception of 
preventing condition X, ranging over each and every factor that could dissuade, distract 
or delay agent A from realizing Y. If there is nothing that could have made Y fall short of 
being realized, then, Nelson argued, Y is ipso facto realized. What follows, then, is that 
all the conceptions of freedom that have historically been formulated in exercise-related 
terms, including the conception of freedom as self-realization, can be reformulated in 
opportunity-related terms, and vice versa. In other words, the so-called “exercise-
concept” of freedom does not, as its defenders have claimed, constitute a conceptually 
distinct category vis-à-vis the “opportunity-concept” of freedom. 
In response to Nelson’s reductionist argument against the revisionist dichotomy, 
John Christman insisted that such reduction fails to take seriously the way in which the 
exercise-concept of freedom “concerns not only the absence of intrusion (by others or 
by natural circumstance) but also one’s ffectiveness as an agent” (Christman 2005: 80, 




A person who faces no internal or external constraints to action may well 
simply fail to act or she may act randomly or inauthentically. Imagine a person 
who acts on every impulse that occurs to her, willy-ni ly, and without any 
coherent plan. A defender of a positive conception of freedom would say that 
she lacked something that is over and above the absnce of constraints to her 
thought and action, namely some quality of her action. (Christman 2005: 84-85) 
 
Christman’s above reply, however, clearly missed the point. For the reductionist 
argument is precisely that the very fact that a person “acts on every impulse that occurs 
to her, willy-nilly, and without any coherent plan” indicates that there still are internal 
constraints to her action: in this case, her weakness of will, lack of willpower in making 
choices, incoherence and myopia in planning one’s life, and other possible forms of 
irrationality. The lack of “some quality of her action” is, in other words, itself the result 
of the presence of certain “constraints to her thoug t and action,” rather than being 
“over and above” the latter.8 
                                                          
8 Another way to think about this issue is by asking what constitutes agency. Here Harry 
Frankfurt’s (1971) classical distinction between first-order and second-order desires may be of 
relevance. According to Frankfurt, the key to being a “person” or an “agent,” as opposed to a 
“wanton,” is the capacity to form second-order voliti ns, that is, second-order desires (desires 
over desires) that one actually wants to be effectiv . In other words, this “person” Christman 
described above “who acts on every impulse that occurs to her, willy-nilly, and without any 
coherent plan” is in fact a wanton who is devoid of second-order volitions, or perhaps of the 
capacity to form them. Others have revised Frankfurt’s account, for example arguing that “the 
key to being a person… consists of the imaginative capacity to formulate projects and values,” 
instead of the capacity to form volitions (Johnston 1994: 93). Still, the lack of volitions, the lack 
of the capacity to form volitions, and the lack of the capacity to formulate projects and values, 
can all be construed as the presence of certain mental constraints on the effective exercise of 
14 
 
Another argument made by Christman was that the implicit syntax of the 
opportunity-concept consists of the future tense whreas that of the exercise-concept the 
present tense: the former basically says that “if people are free they will  do or be” Y 
whereas the latter basically says that “if people are free they are” Y (Christman 2005: 85, 
emphases added). And since these two syntactic strutures are irreducible to each other, 
Christman argued, the two corresponding notions of freedom must be conceptually 
distinct. 
But again, this problem can be solved by revisiting what count as constraints on 
opportunity. One way to do so is to include among constraints one’s insufficient 
learning or experience in moral and practical matters, the solution to which is having 
more time for internalizing and practicing higher ideals. As a result, a temporal 
dimension would be introduced into the notion of constraint, thereby closing the 
ostensible gap between the two “concepts” with respect to the tenses they implicate. 
Indeed, we can explain away any failure to realize or exercise an effective and 
authentic agency by way of broadening the spectrum of internal and external constraints. 
Consequently, even the idea of freedom as self-realization, the “exercise-concept” par 
excellence, can be reformulated in terms of the opportunity-concept of freedom. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
one’s agency, rather than merely as the (rather mysterious) failure of exercising one’s agency 
despite the removal of all relevant constraints. 
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Suppose, for example, one claims that while she has the opportunity to realize her 
higher, rational self (because she is free from constraints such as political oppression, 
social and cultural discrimination, financial difficulties, lack of educational resources, 
and so on), she has not yet achieved self-realization (due either to her weakness of will, 
or irrationality in other forms, or to her lack of time for learning and practicing higher 
ideals, or simply lack of moral luck in the face of hard choices) and is therefore not yet 
free in accordance with the exercise-concept. 
Such claim, it turns out, can be easily reframed as the following: whereas certain 
constraints on her opportunity to achieve self-realization and exercise effective agency 
are absent (such as political oppression, social and cultural discrimination, financial 
difficulties, lack of educational resources, and so on), other constraints have not yet 
been eliminated (such as her weakness of will or other forms of irrationality, her lack of 
time for learning and practicing higher ideals, or her lack of moral luck in the face of 
hard choices). In other words, she is far from acquiring the opportunity for self-
realization, given an extremely broad understanding of the range of constraints. At the 
end of the day, her failure to realize her higher, rational self by no means proves that she 
16 
 
is unfree in a conceptually distinctive “exercise” sense vis-à-vis the “opportunity” 
sense.9 
  
                                                          
9 Before I turn to the next section, I shall briefly address two other closely related distinctions: 
first, the distinction between “formal” and “substan ive” freedom, according to which one is 
substantively free only when she has the resources and capacities to ffectively exercise (or 
enjoy the worth of) her formally granted freedom (cf. Carter 2011); and second, the distinction 
between “external” and “internal” freedom, that is,between the absence (or presence) of 
external constraints (or external enabling factors, called “opportunities”) and that of internal 
constraints (or internal enabling factors, called “abilities”), as I have mentioned in footnote 4 
above. To begin with, there are two ways of understanding the formal/substantive distinction of 
freedom. On the one hand, some might argue that the possession of resources and capacities 
necessary for the effective exercise of formal freedom (though probably not the possession of 
all those resources, e.g. money) constitutes one’s higher, rational self. If this is the case, then 
the refutation, in the following section, of the supposed connection between the dichotomy of 
freedom and the dichotomy of the self applies. On the other hand, some might take the relevant 
resources and capacities as necessary for the opening up of genuine opportunities. If this is the 
case, then the distinction between formal and substantive freedoms is less about the appeal of 
the negative/positive dichotomy of freedom than about the search for a more adequate 
conception of opportunity, and such adequateness would probably be a matter of continuum 
rather than dichotomy. Similar can be said about the external-opportunity/internal-ability 
distinction of freedom. The question of where to draw the boundary between the self and the 
outside world either is orthogonal to the conceptualization of freedom, or else must be answered 
with reference to why some enabling factors, but not others, are morally relevant in thinking 
about freedom, that is, why a certain conception of freedom (and of its morally relevant 
enabling factors) is more justified than its rival conceptions. In neither case does it help explain 
the lasting appeal of the negative/positive dichotomy of freedom. Te next section offers a case 




Freedom and the Self: Berlin Misunderstood 
 
While the putative distinction between the opportunity-concept and the exercise-concept 
of freedom is unsustainable, it is worth looking further at the shared motivating 
sentiment behind such endeavor. To be sure, different authors have expressed this 
sentiment in slightly different terms. Taylor, for example, spoke of the failure of 
“negative” views of freedom to accommodate “the fact of strong evaluation,” namely, 
the fact that we as moral persons have second-order desires about desires, 
discriminating against certain first-order desires a “not just comparatively, but 
absolutely” bad, and therefore can experience those bad desires as “obstacles to [our] 
purposes, and hence to [our] freedom, even though they are in a sense unquestionably 
desires and feelings of [ours]” when we are motivated by them (Taylor 1979: 185-186). 
Christman, by contrast, preferred to talk about the ne d for our conception of freedom 
to measure the “quality of agency,” which he believed is the reason why the exercise-
concept of freedom “goes beyond” the opportunity-concept (Christman 2005: 84). But 
one way or another, what underlies the search for an exercise-concept of freedom is, as 
Maria Dimova-Cookson succinctly summarized, an “aversion to the possibility of 
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associating morally or rationally deficient choices with freedom” (Dimova-Cookson 
2013: 75). 
The exercise-concept theorists’ sentiment is echoed by many who have taken a 
different approach to dichotomizing freedom. Accepting the construal of freedom as a 
single concept with a triadic structure, they argue that conceptions of freedom relevantly 
fall into two contrasting categories in accordance with the ranges those conceptions 
assign to the term variables in the MacCallumite schema, especially to A, the agent, 
and/or X, the preventing condition. Along this line, some have understood the contrast 
between negative and positive freedom as a contrast between, in Berlin’s words, the 
freedom of one’s “‘empirical or ‘heteronomous’ self” and that of one’s “‘real’, or ‘ideal,’ 
or ‘autonomous’ self” (TCL 179). Others have chosen to avoid using the metaphysically 
loaded notion of the self,10 and to highlight, as Nancy Hirschmann did, the related 
conception of “internal and external barriers to liberty” as central to the 
negative/positive dichotomy, with the characterization that “[n]egative liberty 
                                                          
10 Some exercise-concept theorists are concerned with this too. Taylor, for example, tried to 
argue that the idea that “[y]ou are not free if you are motivated, through fear, inauthentically 
internalised standards, or false consciousness, to thwart your self-realisation” can be dissociated 
from the talk of “your own true self,” and therefore that it is “mislead[ing]” to “think that 
exercise-concepts of freedom are tied to some particular metaphysic, in particular that of a 
higher and lower self” (Taylor 1979: 180). 
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emphasizes the role of external barriers, while positive liberty highlights the internal” 
(Hirschmann 2003: 16). 
The popularity of such characterizations has led many to believe that this 
understanding of the negative/positive dichotomy was held by Berlin himself as well – 
after all, it was his lecture that had brought this d chotomy into the center of the 
contemporary debate on freedom. Thus Dimova-Cookson interpreted what Berlin had 
done in his lecture as distinguishing between the two concepts of freedom “in the 
context of personal metaphysics,” where negative freedom stresses “our desires to 
pursue our choices” while positive freedom “reflects our urge to liberate our moral and 
rational potential” (Dimova-Cookson 2013: 75-76). Similarly, Hirschmann contended 
that the “two concepts of liberty, as [Berlin] articulates them, reflect two different – 
though perhaps equally problematic – conceptions of a person: one as innately separate, 
individualistic, unconnected, rights oriented, even a tagonistic; the other innately 
connected, communitarian, even selfless, concerned with responsibility” (Hirschmann 
2003: 16). 
This interpretation is not accurate, however. Even though Berlin, probably out of 
some subliminal polemical considerations, did not always made this point as clear as 
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possible,11 he was in fact firmly against the idea that the negative/positive dichotomy of 
freedom could simply be understood in terms of the diff rence between their underlying 
conceptions of the self. For, on the one hand, Berlin al owed that positive freedom “in 
its original sense” need not take the “autonomous” or “true” self, vis-à-vis the 
“heteronomous” or “empirical” self, to be its agent (TCL 178-179; cf. I 39); on the other 
hand, he stressed that the “magical transformation” by the doctrines of fissured selves 
“can no doubt be perpetrated just as easily with the ‘negative’ concept of freedom” 
(TCL 181; cf. I 37). In a nutshell, the distinction between the “negative” sense of 
freedom and its “positive” counterpart must, according to Berlin, be kept separate from 
the distinction between “innocent” and “distorted” (or “twisted”) conceptions of 
freedom (I 39), or more generally, from the distinction between conceptions of freedom 
that entail different “views of what constitutes a elf, a person, a man” (TCL 181). 
                                                          
11 Indeed, his overdosed rhetoric often tempted readers of “Two Concepts of Liberty” to assume 
that only positive freedom is liable to metaphysical distortion. For example, when he introduced 
the notions of “rational self” and “spiritual slavery,” he presented them as “the independent 
momentum which the […] metaphor of self-mastery acquired” (TCL 179). Berlin later 
complained that “I do not know why I should have been held to doubt” that positive freedom, in 
its original sense, “is a valid universal goal” (I 39). But surely he himself had much to be 
blamed for creating this confusion in understanding. I  this regard, his criticism of T. H. Green 
– “words are important, and a writer’s opinions and purposes are not sufficient to render the use 
of a misleading terminology harmless either in theory r in practice” (I 42, n.) – was well 
applicable to himself. 
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Here one might wonder if, for the sake of making sense of the negative/positive 
dichotomy, Berlin’s own opinion matters anyway. Couldn’t we simply disregard what 
Berlin had said, and draw the line between two senses of freedom solely on the basis of 
their conceptions of the self and/or its constraints? The answer, I argue, is that Berlin 
had offered good reasons to think that this strategy would not work. To illustrate, let us 
first look at another prevalent misinterpretation of Berlin, with regard to his account of 
self-abnegation and its place in the negative and positive genealogies of freedom. 
Most readers of “Two Concepts of Liberty” tend to regard (or to think Berlin 
regarded) self-abnegation not possibly as a twisted version of negative freedom, but 
only as another twisted version of positive freedom, along with self-realization. Indeed, 
it is quite typical for Berlin’s readers to come to the conclusion that he argued that 
“[t]wo major forms, namely, self-abnegation and self-r alisation, historically typify 
positive freedom” (Mills 2011: 51).12 This is, however, a serious misreading of Berlin’s 
genealogical analyses. 
                                                          
12 A few more examples to show how widespread this reading is: “In order to outline the 
phenomenology of positive freedom, Berlin tells us two stories. One of them is the story of self-
abnegation and the other, the story of self-realisation” (Dimova-Cookson 2013: 76); “Berlin 
argues that the notion of positive liberty has histor cally assumed two distinct forms, the point 
of the first being self-abnegation (or what he calls the ‘return to the inner citadel’), and of the 
second self-realization” (Kristjánsson 1996: 94); “The other kind of freedom, the positive 
kind … can take two forms, a drive towards self-abnegation, which Berlin ascribed to the Stoics, 
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Admittedly, Berlin himself must be blamed for much of this confusion, as there 
were many passages in the text of his lecture that seemed to suggest an affinity between 
self-abnegation and positive freedom vis-à-vis negative freedom.13 For example, he 
claimed that self-abnegation and self-realization are “the two major forms which the 
desire to be self-directed – directed by one’s ‘true’ self – has historically taken” (TCL 
181), while throughout the text the term “self-direction” (and related terms such as 
“self-directed” and “self-directive”) was employed only when he was talking about 
positive freedom (cf. TCL 178; 190; 193; 212). In addition, statements such as that “the 
creed of the solitary thinker … enters into the tradition of liberal individualism at least 
as deeply as the ‘negative’ concept of freedom” (TCL 185), and that “[t]hose who are 
wedded to the ‘negative’ concept of freedom may perhaps be forgiven if they think that 
self-abnegation is not the only method of overcoming obstacles; that it is also possible 
to do so by removing them” (TCL 187), also seemed to suggest that self-abnegation nd 
negative freedom are squarely antithetical to each other, rather than may belong to the 
same lineage of conceptual metamorphosis. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
and in particular to the Stoic Epictetus, and a drive for self-realization” (Sorabji 2012: 56); and 
so on. 
13 See footnote 11 above. 
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Nevertheless, both the texts and the inner logic of Berlin’s genealogical analyses 
affirm that what unifies self-abnegation and self-ralization is not that they both follow 
from choosing the positive sense of freedom over its negative counterpart, but that they 
are both the “consequences of distinguishing between two selves” (TCL 181). To begin 
with, at the end of the section on “The Retreat to the Inner Citadel,” closing preceding 
discussions on self-abnegation and anticipating his analyses of self-realization, Berlin 
signaled that, in doing so, he was about to take on th se who “reject the ‘negative’ 
concept of [freedom] in favour of its ‘positive’ counterpart,” and to scrutinize “upon 
what metaphysical foundation [their view] rests” (TCL 187). 
More importantly, the relation between self-abnegation and a deficient variant of 
negative freedom had been implicit in his criticism of Mill’s definition of freedom (cf. 
TCL 186), and was later explicitly acknowledged in his “Introduction” to Four Essays 
on Liberty, where Berlin admitted that the definition of negative freedom, in the original 
version of “Two Concepts of Liberty,” as the “absenc  of obstacles to the fulfillment of 
a man’s desire,” or as the “absence of frustration” for short, would not do (I 30, 32). 
This is so because, if defined in this way, freedom “may be obtained by killing desires” 
(I 32), which means that a despot could claim to have granted negative freedom to his 
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subjects by way of preemptively “conditioning them into losing” whatever desires and 
preferences that he has “decided not to satisfy” (I 31). 
To be sure, those subjects could also proactively “retreat to the inner citadel,” that 
is, abnegate themselves, in order to claim acquisition of inner freedom and spiritual 
liberation in the face of political oppression (I 31-32, TCL 181-187). But the point is 
that self-abnegation – the Stoic elimination of unruly desires and the subsequent 
internalization of indifferent submission to political despotism – is compatible with both 
negative and positive ways of conceptualizing freedom, even if the “negative” sense of 
freedom is understood to be always associated with “empirical” conceptions of the self. 
For self-abnegation could result both from internal direction by the “higher” self, and 
from external disciplining and manipulation, which is allowed by the seemingly 
innocuous “empirical” definition of the self as a bundle of actual desires waiting to be 
fulfilled.14 
                                                          
14 It has been argued that we should distinguish deliberate “character planning” (of which self-
abnegation in the Stoic sense is an example), on the one hand, from “adaptive preference 
formation” through non-conscious causal processes, on the other hand. For the two “have very 
different consequences for freedom”: whereas the latt r results in the “moral self-poisoning” of 
the mind and compromises one’s self-mastery, the former does not (Elster 1983: 119). I doubt 
that their consequences for freedom are as different as Elster thought; but even if they are, it 
does not affect what I have argued so far, which is that those supposed consequences for 
freedom are unaffected by whether freedom is understood “negatively” or “positively.”   
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The above clarification on the affinity of self-abnegation with the “negative” sense 
of freedom15 sheds light on why it is problematic to maintain the negative/positive 
dichotomy of freedom by drawing the line either betw en “empirical” (“lower,” 
“heteronomous,” etc.) and “noumenal” (“higher,” “autonomous,” etc.) conceptions of 
the self, or between “individualistic” and “communitarian” personhood, or between 
“external” and “internal” barriers, or the like. The answer is that those dichotomies are 
often, if not always, conceptually simplistic and normatively unhelpful. As the example 
of self-abnegation suggests, a conception of freedom that ostensibly is on one side of 
any of those divisions may turn out to be indistinguishable from one belonging to the 
opposite category. And they also obliterate the important fact that internal and external 
barriers to freedom are sometimes intertwined and inseparable, as in the case of, say, 
prevalent false consciousness sustained and reinforced by, and at the same time 
sustaining and reinforcing, a deep-rooted social and cultural structure. Addressing these 
                                                          
15 By the same token, it seems that self-realization is ot exclusively affiliated with positive 
freedom either. As Berlin later admitted: “If it is maintained that the identification of the value 
of liberty with the value of a field of free choice amounts to a doctrine of self-realisation, 
whether for good or evil ends, and that this is closer to positive than to negative liberty, I shall 
offer no great objection” (I 53). 
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problems requires us to look at the contents of specific conceptions of freedom, not at 
the negative/positive dichotomy per se, the point of which is, as I will argue, different.16 
Thus, while Dimova-Cookson, in my opinion, rightly claimed that “Berlin’s 
distinction between positive and negative freedom is conceptually justified and 
normatively significant,” she was wrong in concluding that it is so because his 
multifaceted distinction managed to reveal the complexities of “personal metaphysics,” 
and because his dual conceptualization of freedom preserved the tension between 
“look[ing] after our unforced and uncensored choice,” on the one hand, and “tak[ing] 
commitment to moral action,” on the other hand, in the context of personal metaphysics 
                                                          
16 For value pluralists like Berlin, there is one more reason to insist that the difference between 
the two concepts of freedom not be reduced to the diff rence between “genuine” and “perverted” 
conceptions of the self, whether or not it is understood as the distinction between the 
phenomenal and the noumenal. For any such reduction would be antithetical to the recognition 
that there are more than one kind of freedom that is genuinely valuable. Had positive 
conceptions of freedom by definition presupposed a “perverted” notion of the self, it would 
have been impossible to count them as instantiating ultimate values that are as genuine as those 
instantiated by negative conceptions of freedom, which supposedly presupposed a “genuine” 
notion of the self. As a consequence, there would have been no genuine moral conflict between 
those two kinds of freedom, and we would have experienced no tragic loss when choosing 
between them. But this is precisely against what Berlin wanted to emphasize, which was that 
negative and positive freedoms, at least in their “original” or “undistorted” senses, are both 
genuine, basic human values, which are incommensurable yet bound to conflict with each other 
in practice. To be sure, one might question Berlin’s assumption that the idea of a higher, 
rational self is a perverted doctrine and would necessarily lead to the distortion of a conception 
of freedom. But this is a different question from whether a dichotomy of conceptions of 
freedom can be sustained on the basis of their underlying conceptions of the self. 
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(Dimova-Cookson 2013: 84). Rather, the conceptual jstifiability and the normative 
significance of Berlin’s distinction lie somewhere else. 
 
Historical Bifurcation and the Republican Alternative 
 
Given that the conceptual distinction between “empirical” and “noumenal” selves, or 
that between “external” and “internal” barriers, isunhelpful in grounding the 
negative/positive dichotomy of freedom, some might wonder whether the search for a 
purely conceptual ground for such dichotomy is itself misdirected. Could it be the case 
that the bifurcation between two senses of freedom can be understood only if we take 
into account, say, historical and genealogical facts bout the concept? 
The idea that there had been a historical bifurcation of the conceptions of freedom 
dates back at least to Benjamin Constant’s famous differentiation between “the liberty 
of the ancients” and “the liberty of the moderns” (Constant 1988). In his capacity as a 
historian of ideas, Berlin provided a similar yet distinct account of the genesis of the 
negative/positive dichotomy.17 Acknowledging that there are “more than two hundred 
senses of [the word ‘freedom’] recorded by historians of ideas,” Berlin contended that 
                                                          
17 Cherniss (2013: 212-213) recounted how the influence of Constant’s writing on Berlin’s 
thought increased over time and became manifest in “Two Concepts of Liberty” and afterwards. 
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only two of them are the most “central ones, with a great deal of human history behind 
them, and… still to come” (TCL 168-169). Moreover, these two senses of freedom, 
designated “negative” and “positive” respectively, originally stemmed from two 
historically prominent ways of framing, and thinking about, the question of freedom: 
 
the ‘negative’ sense [of freedom or liberty] is invol ed in the answer to the 
question ‘What is the area within which the subject – a person or group of 
persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without 
interference by other persons?’ The second, which I shall call the ‘positive’ 
sense, is involved in the answer to the question ‘What, or who, is the source of 
control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rathe  
than that?’ The two questions are clearly different, ven though the answers to 
them may overlap. (TCL 169, emphases added) 
 
Identifying “not being prevented from choosing as I do by other men” and “being one’s 
own master” as original answers to the two question respectively, Berlin acknowledged 
that they “may, on the face of it, seem concepts at no great logical distance from each 
other – no more than negative and positive ways of aying much the same thing” (TCL 
178). Nevertheless, he claimed, the two questions/answers had historically developed in 
opposite directions with dire practical consequences. 
Crucial to Berlin’s account here is how these two supposedly historically salient 
questions differ in the ways in which they highlight, and implicitly confine, respective 
term variables in the MacCallumite formula of the con ept of freedom. On the one hand, 
29 
 
in speaking of an area of choices free from “interference by other persons,” the first 
question significantly narrows the range of preventing condition X. On the other hand, 
the second question directs our attention to “the source of control or interference,” that 
is, to the identity of agent A. As a result of those framing effects, the cluster of answers 
to the first question tends to focus more on externally imposed coercions and 
interventions, whereas the cluster of answers to the second question is generally more 
receptive to varied notions of the self, and “has in fact, and as a matter of history, of 
doctrine and of practice, lent itself more easily to this splitting of personality into two” 
(TCL 181). 
This difference in what might be called their thos between the two clusters of 
answers does not, admitted Berlin, mean that the notion f self-mastery is predestined to 
philosophical and political distortion. Nor does it mean that the “original meaning” of 
negative freedom is immune from such perversion (I 39). For quite to the contrary, as 
we have seen, defining (negative) freedom as the abs nce of interference with actual, 
rather than possible, choices and activities would pen up the room for self-abnegation. 
Notwithstanding, such difference in ethos would, it seems, still allow Berlin to claim at 
least that, as a matter of historical fact, the negative and positive senses of freedom 
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constitute “not two different interpretations of a single concept, but two profoundly 
divergent and irreconcilable attitudes to the ends of life” (TCL 212). 
According to the historical account, in a nutshell, while it would be futile to uphold 
the negative/positive dichotomy of freedom on a purely conceptual ground, it could 
nonetheless be rationalized in terms of certain family resemblances that have their 
reason in historical origins and developments. These developments singled out two 
particular clusters of conceptions of freedom, vis-à-vis infinitely many other variants, 
which could be constructed out of the basic MacCallum schematization in accordance 
with different values assigned to A, X and Y. Whereas not every such logically possible 
construct has political or normative salience and deserves to be taken seriously, the 
“negative” and “positive” clusters of conceptions of freedom, insofar as they are 
answers to the two historically salient (and, Berlin might think, rather intuitive) 
questions about freedom, have acquired such invaluable salience. 
Critics, however, have disputed both the historical accuracy and the normative 
implication of Berlin’s bifurcation narrative. For example, contemporary “neo-Roman” 
republican theorists, such as Quentin Skinner (e.g. 1986) and Philip Pettit (e.g. 1997; 
2011),18 have argued that Berlin’s narrative neglected a third, radically different way of 
                                                          
18  Despite the “neo-Roman” theorists’ self-proclaimed republican heritage and distancing 
themselves from the liberal tradition, many have argued that, in contrast to “neo-Athenian” 
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understanding freedom that is both historically salient and philosophically valid.19 
Historically, it is argued, it was the conception of freedom as non-domination,20 rather 
than non-interference or self-mastery, that classic authors such as Cicero shared with a 
variety of modern theorists from Machiavelli, Harrington, and Locke, to Rousseau, Kant, 
Mill, and Marx; it underlies both the Roman law tradition crystallized in the Corpus 
Juris Civilis, and feminism, environmentalism, and many other contemporary social 
movements. The historical account for the negative/positive dichotomy, in other words, 
seems to rest on a faulty factual assumption, introduced from the start through Berlin’s 
very framing of the questions about freedom. 
To be sure, the republican historiography of freedom has itself been contested (e.g. 
Kalyvas & Katznelson, 2008), which is a huge debate I cannot adjudicate in this essay. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
republicanism advocated by Michael Sandel (1996), “neo-Roman” republicanism, especially 
Pettit’s normative reconstruction of it, is in fact built on distinctly liberal premises and must be 
seen as a variant of the broader liberal tradition (cf. Larmore 2001). In any case, this debate on 
the relations between republicanism and liberalism is not relevant to this issue discussed in this 
essay, and I will leave it aside. 
19 See, for example, Philip Pettit (1997: 51): “a distinctively republican conception… fits on 
neither side of the now established negative-positive dichotomy. This conception is negative to 
the extent that it requires the absence of dominatio  by others, not necessarily the presence of 
self-mastery, whatever that is thought to involve. The conception is positive to the extent that, at 
least in one respect, it needs something more than e absence of interference; it requires 
security against interference, in particular against i terference on an arbitrary basis.” 
20 Or similar notions, such as non-subjection (cf. Urbinati 2002). 
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But in any case, the more significant criticism the republican theorists raise against 
Berlin’s historical account of the dichotomy is a con eptual and normative one. The 
argument is that, regardless of its historical status, the notion of freedom as non-
domination is, on the one hand, conceptually distinct from both the “negative” and the 
“positive” senses of freedom as Berlin construed them, and on the other hand, 
normative appealing, if not more appealing than the other two. It can neither be 
subsumed by the Berlinian dichotomy, nor be ignored as one of the infinitely many 
trivial variants of the MacCallumite formula. As a consequence, the dichotomy has to 
be either abandoned in favor of a trichotomization of politically relevant conceptions of 
freedom, or worse, sublated altogether by the supposedly more appealing conception of 
freedom as non-domination. 
Pettit has developed this argument in its most systema ic form. Whereas Berlin 
talked about interference and domination indistingushably,21 Pettit argued that at least 
two normatively significant differences between them follow from his definition of 
domination, according to which A dominates B insofar as A has the “capacity to 
                                                          
21 For example: “The fundamental sense of freedom is freedom from chains, from imprisonment, 
from enslavement by others. The rest is extension of this sense, or else metaphor. To strive to be 
free is to seek to remove obstacles; to struggle for personal freedom is to seek to curb 
interference, exploitation, enslavement by men whose ends are theirs, not one’s own. Freedom, 
at least in its political sense, is coterminous with the absence of bullying or domination” (I 48). 
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interfere on an arbitrary basis in certain choices” B could make (Pettit 1997: 52). On the 
one hand, domination can obtain even when A is not actually interfering with B, as long 
as A has the capacity to do so arbitrarily. Consequently, whereas freedom as non-
interference is compatible with “some kinds of autocracy,” insofar as rulers do not 
proactively intrude into certain domains of private choices (TCL 176), this is not the 
case with freedom as non-domination, which leaves room for criticizing such regime on 
the basis of the rulers’ unconstrained power of interference. 
On the other hand, A does not dominate B merely because A has the capacity to 
interfere with B’s choice. Instead, it must be the case the A has to capacity to arbitrarily  
interfere, that is, to interfere at A’s pleasure “without reference to” B’s own “interest” or 
“opinion” (Pettit 1997: 55). Consequently, whereas those who embrace the conception 
of freedom as non-interference, such as Hobbes, Bentham and Berlin, have to concede 
that “[e]very law seems… to curtail some liberty, although it may be a means to 
increasing another” (I 41, n. 1), champions of non-domination see no conflict between 
freedom and the law, so long as it is enacted in accordance with the interests, or the 
opinions, of its subjects. 
This also hints at an important way in which it might be argued that non-
domination transcends Berlin’s sharp distinction between the “negative” cluster of 
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conceptions centered around non-interference and the “positive” cluster of conceptions 
centered around self-mastery, despite Pettit’s disclaimer that non-domination does not 
require “the presence of self-mastery, whatever that is thought to involve” (Pettit 1997: 
51, emphasis added). To begin with, as Pettit’s rema k suggests, what Berlin meant by 
“self-mastery,” which he took to be the “original,” “undistorted” form of positive 
freedom, was ambiguous.22 Nonetheless, later when pressured, Berlin came close t  
admit that the conception of “positive” freedom as self-mastery, when not subject to 
“perversion” of the notion, is equivalent to that of “democratic self-government” (I 39). 
Indeed, according to him, the two fundamental instatiations of the belief that “to be 
free to choose, and not to be chosen for, is an inalienable ingredient in what makes 
human beings human” include, on the one hand, the “negative” demand for an area of 
non-interference, and on the other hand, “the positive demand to have a voice in the 
laws and practices of the society in which one lives” (I 52, emphasis added). 
Acknowledging that both “negative” freedom in the sen e of non-interference and 
“positive” freedom in the sense of democratic self-government are “ultimate value[s]” 
that should “be classed among the deepest interests of mankind,” Berlin nonetheless 
insisted that the two values are in fundamental conflict with each other and “cannot both 
                                                          
22 But see, for example, TCL 177. 
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be fully satisfied” (TCL 212). By contrast, non-domination seems to have a gre ter 
degree of compatibility with the ideal of democratic self-government, or self-mastery 
for that matter, than non-interference does. For if, as republicans argue, domination 
consists only in the capacity to interfere arbitrarly, and if interference is arbitrary only 
when it is done without reference to the interests or opinions of the affected, then the 
fact that democratic procedures of decision-making, by definition, take into account the 
constituents’ opinions would mean that those decisions do not, as such, undermine the 
latter’s freedom from domination.23 
In other words, according to this line of thought, non-domination is not just another 
value in competition with the claim of non-interference and that of self-mastery as 
                                                          
23 Some might also argue that democratic procedures not only take into account the constituents’ 
opinions, but are also more reliable than any other decision-making mechanism in advancing 
the constituents’ interests. This is related to the debate surrounding the so-called “epistemic” 
conception of democracy, which is a huge literature I cannot engage in this essay. But in any 
case, apart from the usual critique of this conception, the argument from epistemic democracy 
does not make an appealing case for the claim that democratic procedures are non-dominating 
by nature. For it is characteristic of modern, plura istic societies that citizens generally disagree 
on matters of moral and political significance, including on their interpretations of the public 
interest as well as their legitimate private interests. As a result, some of them would necessarily 
regard certain interferences enacted through genuinly democratic procedures as failing to 
taking into account their (and possibly the larger public’s) interests, and therefore as dominating. 
In fact, this is also one of the reasons why Pettit is cautious in evoking the instrumentalist 
justification for democracy (cf. Pettit 1997: 61-63). 
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realized in democratic self-government. Rather, it sublates both claims and nullifies the 
related dichotomy between negative and positive fredom. 
 
Value Pluralism and the Modes of Freedom 
 
Upon closer scrutiny, however, this supposed sublation of negative and positive 
freedoms by non-domination evaporates. To begin with, consider the republican claim 
that freedom as non-domination is compatible with democratic self-government in a 
way freedom as non-interference is not. As is shown above, the underlying thought is 
that an act of interference is non-arbitrary to the extent that it refers to the opinions or 
interests of those interfered, and that interferences enacted through a certain democratic 
procedure, to the extent that the latter refers to the opinions of the constituents, do not 
rest on arbitrary bases and therefore cannot be regard d as dominating. 
But what about those whose opinions have been defeated or simply disregarded 
during the process of democratic decision-making? In which sense do interferences 
enacted through the democratic procedure refer to their opinions? One might respond 
that democratic procedures, by definition, are procedures that take into account every 
participant’s opinion, for they are consensual procedures that grant everyone equal 
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formal opportunities to influence policy outcomes through voice or vote. Democratic 
self-government, in other words, is non-arbitrary with respect to opinions, and hence 
non-dominating even for those whose opinions lose, by virtue of its very procedural 
legitimacy. 
One problem with this response, however, is that it suggests we abandon the 
intuition that democratically enacted policies might sometimes wrongly restrict the 
subjects’ freedoms. For if freedom consists solely in one’s not being dominated, and if 
non-domination is guaranteed by the purely procedural reference to one’s opinion, 
regardless of the substantive divergence between her opinion and the interference 
enacted, then insofar as its enactment satisfies purely procedural requirements one has 
no ground to complain that the interference enacted violates her freedom, which is now 
– presumably correctly – understood as non-dominatio . But this idea is not only 
counterintuitive but also dangerously complacent, as it makes it impossible to appraise 
democratic decisions in terms of their effect on the subjects’ freedom, neutralizing a 
powerful conceptual tool criticizing and preventing missteps of the democratic majority. 
Pettit was aware of this problem with the purely proceduralist argument for 
democracy’s being non-dominating. The non-arbitrariness of democratic decisions does 
not, he argued, follow from their “having originated or emerged according to some 
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consensual process,” but instead from their “being such that if they conflict with the 
perceived interests and ideas of the citizens, then citizens can effectively contest 
them.” According to this alternative view, what makes democratically enacted 
interferences non-dominating is not their procedural legitimacy but “their modal or 
counterfactual responsiveness to the possibility of contestation” (Pettit 1997: 185). 
But the contestability argument might lead to some other undesirable consequences. 
For, in order for a democratic decision to claim counterfactual responsiveness to the 
possibility of contestation, it seems that at least it has to be responsive to actual 
contestation. This, moreover, implies that whenever there are citizens who keep 
dissenting and contesting a democratically enacted interference, the latter is non-
dominating only if it is actually responsive to their dissent and contestation, and 
therefore cannot claim itself to be binding or authoritative over the these citizens. On 
the other hand, however, in order to for democratic procedures to function as effective 
mechanisms of decision-making, it seems that their decisions must enjoy certain kind of 
bindingness or authority, even if disputes may remain over whether some legitimate 
interest was unjustifiably abridged. Under the contestability view, in other words, The 
non-domination of democratically enacted interferences over those who contest them 
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could be guaranteed only at the cost of democratic authority, which, it seems, is a too 
great a cost to afford.24 
In a nutshell, while the dichotomy between negative fre dom as non-interference 
and positive freedom as democratic self-government ca not be grounded solely on the 
basis of the historical fact of bifurcation, the republican attempt to replace this 
dichotomy with a supposedly unifying account of freedom as non-domination fails to 
take hold either. On the contrary, the negative/positive dichotomy of freedom persists in 
spite of conceptual maneuver, and suggests the existence of an ineradicable tension 
between two fundamental claims that are both genuinely freedom-based. 
The ostensible ineradicability of such tensions, and s a result the persistent appeal 
of the negative/positive dichotomy of freedom, can be plausibly explained, I believe, 
only in terms of value pluralism. Roughly speaking, value pluralism claims that there 
are a plurality of genuine, objective values that are incommensurable, and that clashes 
among those values, or among their respective instantia ions in practical contexts, are, 
in principle, unavoidable. Berlin himself was famous for being an early espouser of 
                                                          
24 For a similar but more detailed argument against the contestability view of democratic non-
domination, see Vinx (2010). 
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such view. Nonetheless, his account of value pluralism was underdeveloped, 25 and there 
have been various versions of refinement and defens in recent decades.26 In this essay I 
will not go into the details of my own version of value pluralism, which are developed 
in the other two essays. Instead, I will presume that it is a plausible view27 and sketch 
how it would buttress the negative/positive dichotomy of freedom. 
To begin with, recall that, as I have argued in the second and third sections above, 
various attempts to defend a distinct concept of freedom as an end-state in which one 
necessarily acts morally and rationally, vis-à-vis that of freedom as the presence of 
opportunities to choose in accordance with one’s certain desires and judgments that may 
                                                          
25 Janos Kis (2013) succinctly summarized the ambiguities within Berlin’s own understanding 
of value pluralism. In the next essay I will provide a more coherent view of value pluralism and 
its core ideas. 
26 To name a few: Bernard Williams (2005; cf. Berlin & Williams 1994), Joseph Raz (1986; 
2013), Ruth Chang (2002; 2013), George Crowder (2002; 2 04), William Galston (1999; 2002; 
2005), and so on. I discuss some of these versions of value pluralism in the other two essays. 
27 Saying that a version of value pluralism is plausible is weaker than saying that it is 
necessarily the correct meta-ethical view. In fact, one might doubt that the meta-ethical warfare 
between value pluralism and its rival theories, or between different versions of value pluralism, 
could ever be settled. For example, William Galston, a  advocate of Berlinian value pluralism, 
admitted that he was not sure whether “pluralists will ever be able to show that monists ‘cannot’ 
be right, or vice versa” (Galston 2005: 16). But this does not prevent us from arguing that 
certain meta-ethical view can be plausibly, or persuasively, elaborated, and that persuasive 
elaboration is what is needed for embracing a philosophical stance in any case. See, for example, 
Gary Gutting (2009) on the idea of persuasive elabor tion. 
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or may not be deficient, fail to take hold. Value pluralists are not surprised by this. For 
according to value pluralism, freedom is just one of the many equally genuine yet 
incommensurable values. A free choice does not necessarily lead to the realization of 
any other value; instead, it might well lead to therealization of certain disvalue, and 
consequently implies a conflict between freedom as a value, on the one hand, and the 
corresponding value of the realized disvalue, on the other hand. The value of freedom, 
according to this view, is instantiated not in the substantive content of a particular 
choice that is freely made, but in the way in which the choice is made. Put another way, 
freedom has a distinct mode of instantiation vis-à-vis other values.28 
Not only can freedom’s special mode of instantiation explain its potential conflict 
with the realization of other values, but it also bears on the question of why there 
ostensibly is an ineradicable tension between two senses of freedom, the dichotomy 
between which cannot be eliminated by the introduction of a presumably synthesizing 
conception, such as that of freedom as non-dominatio . The genesis of such tension 
begins with the truism that choices and actions have externalities, at least when a 
multitude of moral persons cohabit the world. To function, a society needs rules and 
                                                          
28 This is not to say that other values’ modes of insta tiation are all the same. Rather, I tend to 




procedures in order to draw the boundaries of permissible choices and actions by each 
member of the society, and therefore to regulate the externalities of those choices and 
actions. Since, as a member of the society, one’s range of permissible choices and 
actions, on the one hand, and the impact on her choosing and acting by the externalities 
of other members’ permissible choices and actions, on the other hand, are both 
determined by those rules and procedures, it follows that, in addition to a freedom-based 
interest in determining for herself how to choose and ct in her own life, she also has a 
freedom-based interest in playing a role in determining those rules and procedures, 
namely, in determining where to draw the boundaries and how to neutralize the 
externalities. 
In other words, the fact that one lives not in isolati n but in a society implies that 
her freedom is instantiated necessarily in two modes. On the one hand, her freedom is 
instantiated in her access to a relatively extensive range of permissible choices and 
actions, so as to effectively give shape to her lif in light of her own judgment. On the 
other hand, her freedom is also instantiated in her access to participation in the public 
determination and demarcation of such sphere, namely, h r right to democratic self-
government. The fact that freedom is instantiated ncessarily in two modes is what 
ultimately grounds the dichotomization between “negative” and “positive” senses of 
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freedom. In fact, Berlin sometimes came close to this conclusion, as, for example, when 
he wrote the following: 
 
[The idea] that to be free to choose, and not to be chosen for … underlies both 
the positive demand to have a voice in the laws and practices of the society in 
which one lives, and to be accorded an area, artificially carved out, if need be, 
in which one is one’s own master, a ‘negative’ area in which a man is not 
obliged to account for his activities to any man so far as this is compatible with 
the existence of organised society. (I 52) 
 
The negative/positive dichotomy of freedom, in other words, is the reflection of a 
tension within the value of freedom itself, due to its necessarily having two modes of 
instantiation given the fact that we live with one another rather than in isolation. 
Such tension, in addition, is ineradicable for the same reason why, according to 
value pluralism, the conflicts between freedom(s) and other values, as well as those 
among other values, are in principle unavoidable. This is so because both the “negative” 
freedom instantiated in the access to an extensive sph re of private liberties, on the one 
hand, and the “positive” freedom instantiated in the access to democratic self-
government, on the other hand, make genuine claims that are non-reducible to each 
other. To make good the claim of democratic self-government requires the democratic 
decisions have authority over those whose choices and actions are regulated. Yet to 
recognize the authority of democratic decisions over oneself with regard to certain cases 
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is to limit one’s range of permissible choices and ctions in those cases, and to narrow 
the sphere in which she could determine for herself how to live in accordance with her 
own judgment. Ultimately, a tradeoff is unavoidable, and any attempt to reconcile these 
two claims by means of conceptual maneuver would, as the previous analyses of non-
domination suggest, either exempt democratic decisions from critical appraisal of their 
substantive content, or risk diminishing the authority of democratic procedures to the 
point of indecision. 
Finally, according to value pluralism, not only do the two modes of instantiating 
freedom unavoidably conflict, but their claims are lso, in principle, incommensurable 
with each other. As a consequence, neither claim takes  priori precedence over the 
other, and, more importantly, we do not know in advance whether there is any single, 
principled way to judge their respective weightiness and calibrate the proper balance 
between them in a given practical context. Many would, of course, object. For example, 
some believe that when “the authority of democratic de isions is extended” at the cost 
of one’s range of permissible choices and actions in light of her own judgment, the “loss 
in autonomy almost certainly far outweighs the purported gain” (Viehoff 2014: 350-
351). In the following essays I will refute those objections, argue instead that negative 
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and positive freedoms, as well as other basic values, are indeed incommensurable, and 







Value Pluralism and Its Compatibility with Liberalism 
 
Value pluralism is, to use Isaiah Berlin’s definition, the view that there is, for human 
beings, an irreducible plurality of equally genuine y t mutually incommensurable 
values29, which, when practiced or pursued, are often in coflict with one another. 
Moreover, since genuine ultimate values are incommensurable, some cases of value 
conflict may turn out to be irresolvable, as there is no guarantee that rational 
adjudications can, in principle, be found in those cases. Espoused first by Berlin, value 
pluralism has since gained a legion of adherents, icluding, to name a few, Bernard 
Williams, Martha Nussbaum, Joseph Raz, Ruth Chang, John Gray, and William Galston. 
As value pluralists, their summum malum is monism, the idea that every moral question 
                                                          
29 In Berlin’s terminology, values include only those that are valued for their own sake (Berlin 
2013: 11-12), or what we commonly call “ultimate” or “intrinsic” values but not those that are 
valued either as means to other ends or as instantia io s of other goods, or what we commonly 
call “derivative” or “instrumental” values (cf. Raz’s [1986] differentiation between “ultimate vs. 
derivative” and “intrinsic vs. instrumental” values). Genuine values, according to Berlin, are 
those which it is warranted, or objectively correct, to regard as (ultimate) values. 
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has a single true answer that is in principle discoverable, and that once discovered, all 
the true answers would form a single, coherent whole. 
At the same time, most value pluralists are also staunch defenders of liberalism in 
the broad sense. Take Berlin for example. Not only did he reject monism as resting on 
“a false a priori view of what the world is like” (Berlin 2002: 43), but he further argued 
that value pluralism supports liberalism while monism does not. Indeed, he took humans’ 
propensity of seeking monist utopias to be the main drive behind history towards 
totalitarianism, the greatest political evil in the 20th century. In Berlin’s view, only by 
accepting value pluralism as constitutive of the human condition can we readily 
embrace the sacredness of liberal principles and resist the temptation of various utopian 
fantasies. 
Critics have argued, however, that this liberal pluralist stance Berlin represented is 
incoherent, at the center of which lies an intractable tension between the thesis of value 
pluralism and a commitment to liberalism. For liberalism presumably entails the priority 
or superiority of certain value (e.g. freedom), or set of values, over its rival values, or 
sets of values, and this is quite antithetical to the pluralist claim that all ultimate values 
are equally genuine and incommensurable. Liberal pluralists like Berlin thus face a 
dilemma: either they must bite the bullet of value pluralism, abandoning the 
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universalistic ambition of liberalism as monist and hence as illegitimate, or they have to 
commit whole-heartedly to liberal values without the pretense of a pluralist worldview. 
At the end of the day, as a commentator on Berlin neatly summarizes, “a pluralist 
logically cannot put liberty first” (Ignatieff 1998: 286). 
Can the tension between value pluralism and liberal commitment be solved? This 
essay and the next together argue that it can. In this essay, I will first establish the 
plausibility of the thesis of value pluralism, by clarifying and elaborating its three key 
concepts: value objectivity, value incompatibility, and value incommensurability. I will 
then propose and defend the idea of modal heterogeneity of value instantiation, vis-à-vis 
that of a valuative hierarchy (which is in tension with value incommensurability). I will 
argue that different values have different modes of instantiation, that such difference 
warrants differentiated prioritization of certain values in relevant practical contexts, and 
that such prioritization does not imply anything about the comparative moral worth of 
relevant values. 
Understood in this way, value pluralism is not only compatible with liberalism, but 
could also strengthen commitments to the latter by building a new road to its grounding. 
Indeed, the next essay will compare my account of mdal heterogeneity with other 
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existing strategies for justifying liberal pluralism, and will explore some of its 
significant political implications. 
 
Two Preliminary Remarks 
 
Before I proceed to the substance of my argument, two methodological remarks are in 
order. First, when I make the case for the plausibility of value pluralism and for its 
compatibility with liberalism in this essay, I will use Berlin’s characterization of value 
pluralism both as the starting point and as the main reference point. 
To be sure, Berlin’s account of value pluralism was sketchy and unelaborated, 
especially when compared with developments by later pluralists. Moreover, as someone 
who started his career as a trained analytical philosopher but was quickly disillusioned 
first with logical empiricism and then with the ordinary language school (cf. Berlin 
1999), Berlin never purported to develop a systematic, philosophical theory of how 
value pluralism justifies, rather than undermines, liberalism. His writings were more 
about historical, rather than logical, connections between pluralism and liberalism, or 
between monism and anti-liberalism. Occasionally he did offer more substantive 
arguments in defense of his position, such as the famous “argument from choice” by the 
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end of “Two Concepts of Liberty” (Berlin 2007: 213-214), but these arguments are 
sporadic and, as many commentators have shown, logically flawed. 
But there are benefits from starting with, and referring mainly to, Berlin’s account. 
While later pluralists have developed various refind versions of value pluralism at the 
meta-ethical level, the key ideas remain clearly Berlinian. If value pluralism is plausible 
at all, it is sufficient, at least for the purpose of this essay, to rely mostly on Berlin’s 
texts, in which those key ideas already crystallized.30 This, of course, does not mean 
that I will not engage with other important elaborations of value pluralism when needed. 
In addition, arguments for and against the possibility of liberal pluralism can, in a 
sense, all trace back to disputes over the strengths and weaknesses of Berlin’s account. 
For example, although defenders of Berlin’s liberal pluralism, such as George Crowder 
(2002; 2004), William Galston (1999; 2002; 2005) and Jonathan Riley (2013), among 
others, have refined his arguments and developed their own in order to solve the above 
mentioned dilemma, they have, as I will show in the next essay, either invoked moves 
equally problematic to those in Berlin’s defense (as in the cases of Crowder and 
                                                          
30 This combination of interpretive and normative arguments in my approach can also contribute 
to the scholarship of Berlin studies too. John Rawls once advised that “in looking at [a seminal 
text in political theory,] if you are to get as much out of it as you can, you must try to interpret it 
in the best and most interesting way” (Rawls 2007: 52). By taking Berlin as a starting point, I 
hope to reconstruct, in “the best and most interesting way,” his inspiring thoughts on value 
pluralism and liberalism (or more accurately liberal democracy, as I will show in the next essay). 
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Galston), or implicitly abandoned certain core ideas of Berlin’s thesis and in effect 
trivialized it (as in the case of Riley). Starting with Berlin would thus help situate my 
account in this whole debate and illustrate its contributions. 
Second, since one of the aims of this essay is to make a case for the plausibility of 
the thesis of value pluralism, it is worth commenting briefly on whether and how this 
could be done at all. To begin with, meta-ethics, no more or less than other areas of 
philosophy, is full of intractable fundamental disagreements, and the debate between 
monism and pluralism appears to be one of them. One has good reason to doubt, if not 
to deny, that this debate will ever be settled by some knockdown argument against one 
side, or that “pluralists will ever be able to show that monists ‘cannot’ be right, or vice 
versa” (Galston 2005: 16). 
But value pluralists may aim at a milder achievement than knocking down monism. 
In fact, as Gary Gutting has argued, the generation of philosophical knowledge might 
consist not in the first-order establishment of the“truth” of a certain philosophical 
picture of the world vis-à-vis its theoretical rivals, but instead in the “second-order” 
presentation of “a strong case for a picture’s potential for fruitful development,” that is, 
of “very good reasons for taking it seriously and working to develop it” (Gutting 2009: 
4). In accordance with Gutting’s idea of “persuasive elaboration,” by which he referred 
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to the process of demonstrating that a philosophical picture is viable and fruitful, so 
long as value pluralists can persuasively elaborate the case for thinking that there are 
irreducibly multiple incommensurable values, they are entitled to hold, as Berlin did, 
that, plausibly, monism rests on “a false a priori view of what the world is like” (Berlin 
2007: 43). 
Monism, of course, is not the only adversary to value pluralism. As a critic pointed 
out, the exclusive focuses by several Berlin-inspired value pluralists on the pluralism-
versus-monism debate betrayed their taking for granted “the truth of a position which in 
meta-ethical theory remains the object of keen disagreement – namely, that value is a 
thing of a sort, about which it is correct, not merely intelligible, to think that there are 
facts. Sometimes, claims of this kind are held alongside a Humean, or at any rate non-
cognitivist, position on the nature of value in general. The assumption that pluralists 
have only to prove their case against monists ignores the vulnerability of both to anti-
realist positions in the philosophy of value” (Newey 1998: 494). 
It is worth noting, however, that Berlin himself was not blind to this front of meta-
ethical warfare. On the contrary, he was aware thathis value pluralism must be 
distinguished from what he (imprecisely) called “relativism,” which claims that “my 
values are mine, yours are yours, and if we clash, too bad, neither of us can claim to be 
53 
 
right” (Berlin 2000: 15). For the “multiple values” he had in mind, Berlin contended, 
are “objective, part of the essence of humanity rather han arbitrary creations of men’s 
subjective fancies,” such that “the pursuit of them” ust be regarded as “an objective 
given,” being “part of what it is to be a human being” (Berlin 2000: 14).31 
This contention involves two theses. First, pace anti-cognitivism, value pluralism 
claims that genuine values are objective, not subjective. Second, the validity of genuine 
values is universal, not parochial. That is, each and every of them, insofar as it is a 
genuine value, lays claim – in a certain sense – on all (sane) human beings, including 
those who do not actually pursue this value. To make the case for value pluralism vis-à-
vis what Berlin called “relativism,” both theses above must be persuasively elaborated. 
The most important reason why pluralism must be distinguished from relativism is 
that Berlin intended the former to be supportive of his liberal commitment, whereas 
liberalism is fundamentally universalistic in aspirat on, claiming the objective and 
universal validity of liberal values. It is therefore evident that, in addition to the 
objectivity and universal validity of genuine values, a value pluralist who is at the same 
                                                          
31 Notice that the term “value(s)” is ambiguous, and could be used in various ways, for example 
denoting either the objective validity or desirability of certain goods, ends or lifestyles, or the 
subjective beliefs (or value-systems) of individuals or groups concerning such validity or 
desirability. It has now been widely acknowledged that Berlin’s value pluralism is about the 




time a liberal would also need to show, before proceeding to the challenge raised by 
value incommensurability, that basic liberal values are among the genuine values that 
are objective and universally valid, or at least that there is good reason to think so. 
Otherwise value pluralism would immediately become antithetical to liberalism. 
In other words, the picture of value pluralism, insofar as it is meta-ethically and 
normatively appealing, must, when claiming value objectivity, consist of a plausible 
account at least for the following features of objective genuine values: the irreducibility 
of their plurality, the universality of their validity, and the necessary inclusion of basic 
liberal values among them. What, then, was Berlin’s account for this cluster of features? 
 
Objective Values and the Human Horizon 
 
Berlin appealed to the idea of a common “human horizon” in accounting for value 
objectivity and the abovementioned features of objectiv  values. To begin with, for 
Berlin, objective values are multiple yet finite, the number of which is limited (and 
constituted) by the extent to which any human being can “pursue [these values] while 
maintaining his human semblance, his human character” (Berlin 2000: 12). The 
plurality of objective values, does not, however, mean that pluralism is “fundamentally 
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a doctrine about the multiple sources of value,” as Charles Larmore (1996: 156) has it. 
On the contrary, the multiple genuine, non-reducible values all have one and the same 
“source,” namely, a common “human horizon,” “a horiz n which for the most part, at a 
great many times, in a great many places, has been what human beings have consciously 
or unconsciously lived under, against which values, conduct, life in all its aspects have 
appeared to them” (Berlin 2013: 316; cf. 11, 80 etc).32 Each of these genuine values, 
Berlin would say, “is an inalienable ingredient in what makes human beings human” 
(2007: 52), even though each of them represents a di tinctive aspect or facet of this 
humanness. 
The existence of the human horizon, the common moral ground against which we 
value, practice in accordance with our values, and comprehend and evaluate one 
another’s values and practices, is, Berlin argues, entailed by the fact that different 
people and different cultures can understand, thoug not necessarily agree with, one 
another’s value-systems. Otherwise our thoughts and ctions would have become 
unintelligible at all to one another. For example, whereas worshipping a tree because of 
one’s belief in the tree’s mysterious power of granting fertility is a recognizably human 
practice despite being superstitious, worshipping a tree merely because it is a tree, 
                                                          




without giving further justifying reason, is utterly incomprehensible (Berlin 2013: 12).33 
The very possibility of communications across indivi uals and societies, according to 
Berlin, implies that the “relativity and the subjective nature of values” have been 
“exaggerated by philosophers” (Berlin 2007: 44). 
Some commentators have noticed that Berlin sometimes spoke of the human 
horizon as what humans have lived under “for the most part, at a great many times, in a 
great many places,” and what “we call human values” as ultimate values that “have 
been pursued in common by a great many people in very many places, over very long 
periods of time.” In addition, Berlin has also asserted that there is no “guarantee that 
this will go on forever, or has never been absent or altered in the past” (Berlin 2013: 
316); on the contrary, the existence of such a human horizon, and the pursuit of these 
human values, are only a matter of “empirical fact – basic, but still only empirical” 
(Berlin 2013: 314). 
But this sounds rather problematic. After all, isn’t the insistence on the empirical 
nature of the human horizon and human values contradic ory to the idea that values are 
                                                          
33 This does not imply anthropocentricism tout court. Rather, it implies that for any presumably 
anti-anthropocentric view (such as “deep ecology,” the idea that living beings and environments 
are intrinsically valuable regardless of their instrumental utilities to human needs) to be 
comprehensible at all, its justification must ultimately resort to reasons and value-claims that 
can be made sense of within the human horizon. 
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objective, rendering them instead “what people happen to want rather than as 
components of a human essence” (Crowder 2004: 133)? 
Besides Berlin’s characteristic caution and restrain  in tone, the claimed empiricity 
of the human horizon and human values must be understood in light of the context in 
which Berlin takes pains to distance his position from the “Platonist” version of monism, 
the summum malum that stands behind his political thought. According to Platonists, 
basic values exist prior to human experience, constitute a timeless realm of ultimate 
ends or ideal forms, and wait for rational agents to discover. On the contrary, while 
value pluralism accepts that the fact that there arcertain objective values is 
“presupposed… by the very notions of morality and humanity as such” (Berlin 2007: 
45), he holds that this is only “an empirical, undemonstrable, de facto acceptance of 
what… human experience provides”; for “it is a matter of empirical fact that in so far as 
communication between human beings is possible, across time and space as well as 
within single communities, this is based on a common human nature (or outlook) which 
alone makes this possible” (Berlin 2013: 316, emphasis dded).34 
                                                          
34 It might be worth pointing out a (small?) confusion Berlin was making here. Whereas it is 
indeed “a matter of empirical fact” that communicaton between human beings has occurred 
across time and space, the existence of a common human horizon, given that such 
communication has occurred, is nothing empirical. Instead, the argument that the need for a 
common human horizon is entailed by the requirement of value intelligibility, which is in turned 
entailed by the possibility of human understanding, is a paradigm a priori reasoning. Only when 
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For Berlin, therefore, “to speak of our values as objective and universal is not to 
say that there exists some objective code, imposed upon us from without, unbreakable 
by us because not made by us; it is to say that we cannot help accepting these basic 
principles because we are human, as we cannot help (if we are normal) seeking warmth 
rather than cold, truth rather than falsehood, to be recognised by others for what we are 
rather than to be ignored or misunderstood” (2013: 216, emphasis added). In other 
words, Berlin saw the acceptance of genuine values and related principles as linked with 
certain dispositions that are built in to the normal functioning of human mind and body, 
just as the needs for warmth, truth and recognition are. Given the common physiological 
and psychological features of human beings (for example, their physical and emotional 
vulnerabilities, their “power of moral discrimination,” and so on) as well as certain 
basic external conditions they have to live with (for example, the scarcity of resources), 
humans’ propensity to pursue certain values, perhaps each as “a response to a basic 
                                                                                                                                                                             
this line of a priori argument and the empirical actuality of human understanding are combined 
does it lead to the conclusion about the existence of the human horizon. Strictly speaking, 
Berlin’s argument for value pluralism cannot be purely empirical, but must aim at a contingent 
a priori truth. To be sure, this amendment does not alter th  essential empiricity of Berlin’s 
approach, as the latter is inevitably premised on empirical assumptions about the commonalities 
and differences among human beings: even if human beings, “because they are [human], have 
enough in common biologically, psychologically, socially, however this comes about, to make 
social life and social morality possible,” it is merely an “empirical fact – basic, but still only 
empirical” (Berlin 2013: 309; 314). 
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need of men” (Berlin 2007: 50), would necessarily emerge. If that is the case, then those 
values could, in a sense, retain a status of “objective given,” as “their nature, the pursuit 
of them, is part of what it is to be a human being” (Berlin 2000: 14). 
Moreover, to the extent that the dispositions with which these values are connected, 
and the basic needs to which these values are responding, are ubiquitous conditions 
among normally functioning human bodies and minds, the validity of these values must 
be universal as well, in the sense that the principles that realiz  and promote these 
values must be taken as “presuppositions of being human at all, of living in a common 
world with others, of recognising them, and being ourselves recognised, as persons.” 
Accordingly, it is not because, as conventionalists (to whom Berlin occasionally seemed 
to belong) would claim, of the fact that certain principles and rules have “been accepted 
by the majority of men, during, at any rate, most of recorded history,” but rather 
because of the invariable built-in human dispositions to genuine values, which in one 
way or another underlie these long and widely recognized principles and rules, that “we 
cannot conceive of getting these universal principles or rules repealed or altered” 
(Berlin 2013: 216-217, emphasis added). 
From the liberal perspective, nonetheless, there are other worries about the idea of 
a human horizon as Berlin presented it. For one thing, it has been argued that such a 
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common horizon, if it exists at all, is too thin for its value prescriptions to be 
normatively meaningful. “The historical record,” Crowder argued, “provides little 
evidence of anything actually desired or admired by all, or even most, human societies 
except goods or virtues described at the very highest level of generality” (Crowder 2004: 
134). After all, Berlin even insisted that the Nazi’s value-system and related practices, 
however “detestable,” are still grounded on certain objective values that are themselves 
within the human horizon, and thusly legitimate “asa human pursuit” (Berlin 2000: 12-
13). 
This should not be a problem if we insist, as Berlin d d in his better moments, on 
the distinction between objective values and subjectiv  beliefs about value. Any 
recognizably human belief, or system of beliefs, about value must be rooted in, or 
inferred from, certain basic, universal, objective values. But not all those beliefs, or 
systems of beliefs, are correctly inferred, and hence ot all of them are correct. It is, 
according to Berlin, important to understand both that the inference of the concrete Nazi 
value-system and practices from those objectively lgitimate values in which they are 
supposedly grounded is seriously flawed, accompanying indoctrination “with enough 
false education, enough widespread illusion and error,” and how, despite being 
recognizably human, “given enough misinformation, eough false belief about reality, 
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one could come to believe that they are the only savation” (Berlin 2000: 12). In 
addition, this is related to a further point that the acquisition and “application of 
knowledge and skill… in particular cases” (Berlin 2007: 42) play an indispensible role 
both in the justification of liberal pluralism and in extrapolating its political implications, 
as I will argue. 
But liberals might have another reason to be concerned with the empiricity of the 
human horizon and human values. If values that “have been pursued in common by a 
great many people in very many places, over very long periods of time” are what 
“alone… we call human values” (Berlin 2013: 314), then “even if virtues such as 
courage might be plausible candidates of human values by Berlin’s standard, it is 
“highly dubious” that typical liberal values, such as “liberty and equality, not to mention 
social welfare” have been championed by most of the societies in history (Crowder 
2004: 134). On the contrary, it might be the case that he championship of liberal values 
is a local phenomenon, only crystallized in the process of political modernization, rather 
than the universal instantiation of a common human horizon. 
One way Berlin might have responded is to claim that for most societies 
throughout history, the human horizon against which liberal values and conducts would 
eventually appear have been “unconsciously lived under,” and even that the pursuit of 
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these values have been implicitly practiced to a certain degree in each of these societies, 
despite the lack of an awareness and theorizing of it by members of that society. 
Of course, this claim would have to be substantiated by further arguments. These 
arguments, moreover, would not take the form of solid empirical evidence. For one 
thing, as Berlin acknowledged, “the question of what in fact are the values which we 
regard as universal and ‘basic’” is “quasi-empirical” rather than straightforwardly 
empirical, since “concepts and categories that dominate life and thought over a very 
large portion (even if not the whole) of recorded history are difficult, and in practice 
impossible, to think away” (2007: 45). But more importantly, it is because what counts 
as “the essence of humanity” (2000: 12) and relatedy what counts “an inalienable 
ingredient in what makes human beings human” (2007: 52) are ultimately normative 
questions, and have to be answered by conceptual and normative analyses of the human 
nature and the way it grounds various basic, ultimate values, despite Berlin’s overall 
reluctance to engage with such issues. Before turning to those questions, however, let us 





Value Conflict without Normative Incoherence 
 
Despite their common origins in the human horizon, the multiple, objective values may 
nonetheless collide. Thus any individual, or group, or society, may at a certain moment 
be confronted with “many objective ends, ultimate values, some incompatible with 
others,” and “find itself subject to conflicting claims of uncombinable, yet equally 
ultimate and objective, ends” (Berlin 2013: 83). When such conflict occurs, there is in 
principle no discoverable pattern in which all values are rendered harmonious, and the 
agent at issue, having to pursue some of them at the sacrifice of others, could find no 
way to circumvent the occurrence of great moral loss. 
The incompatibility and incommensurability (to whic I will turn in next section) 
of value are what trouble liberal pluralists. Some of them, such as Jonathan Riley, have 
tried to mitigate the potential threat the value incompatibility thesis posts to liberalism, 
by dividing values into two categories, namely, “certain very important common values 
and facts, which are universally recognized and given priority by normal humans with 
their generic capacity of reason,” on the one hand,  “many other less important and 
mutually incompatible values,” on the other hand (Riley 2013: 66). 
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But this move – containing conflict within the realm of “less important” values 
while aspiring for the harmony among “very important” ones – trivializes Berlin’s 
thesis.35 Berlin surely does not merely accept this milder claim, which is akin to the 
Rawlsian idea of the discoverability of a “fully adequate scheme” of all “primary goods” 
that are “lexically prior,” leaving other ends as a matter of personal preference (cf. 
Rawls 1971). Instead, value pluralism asserts more radically that conflict exist even 
among values with fundamental importance: 
 
[The] issue is not one between negative freedom as an absolute value and other, 
inferior, values. It is more complex and more painful. One freedom may abort 
another; one freedom may obstruct or fail to create conditions which make 
other freedoms, or a larger degree of freedom, or freedom for other persons, 
possible; positive and negative freedom may collide; the freedom of the 
individual or the group may not be fully compatible with a full degree of 
participation in a common life, with its demands for co-operation, solidarity, 
fraternity. But beyond all these there is an acute issue: the paramount need to 
satisfy the claims of other, no less ultimate, values: justice, happiness, love, the 
realization of capacities to create new things and experiences and ideas, the 
discovery of the truth. (Berlin 2007: 48) 
 
Ronald Dworkin, one of the most fervent critics of Berlin’s incompatibility thesis, 
argues that this idea rests on a deep misunderstanding of the nature of value-concepts, 
and of normative concepts in general. Normative concepts, according to Dworkin, are 
interpretive concepts rather than natural-kind concepts. Since “interpretation knits 
                                                          
35 Regarding the issue of trivialization, footnote 37 below may be of relevance. 
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values together,” there could be “no genuine conflicts” among them. An apparent 
conflict in value is merely an indicator for the need to “reinterpret our concepts to 
resolve our dilemma,” and “truth about morality” could be acquired “only by pursuing 
coherence endorsed by conviction.” Indeed, it is our moral responsibility to make “our 
various concrete interpretations” – “about what is good or right or beautiful” – “achieve 
an overall integrity so that each supports the others in a network of value that we 
embrace authentically. To the extent that we fail in that interpretive project […] we are 
not acting fully out of conviction, and so we are not fully responsible” (Dworkin 2011: 
101, 119, 120, emphasis added). 
Notice that Dworkin’s “unity of value” thesis (2011: ), or “value holism” (2011: 
120), is a much stronger claim that the view than what might be called “normative 
holism” (akin to W. V. O. Quine’s holism about epistemic beliefs) that all of a rational 
agent’s normative convictions would, or ought to, cohere, given careful reflections and 
due interpretations. Normative holism does not requir  that normative convictions, lest 
to say concrete interpretations about what is valuable, proactively support one another, 
such that there can be no genuine conflict in value. 
It might seem at first glance that value pluralism entails normative incoherence and 
is incompatible with normative holism. For if there are “many objective ends, ultimate 
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values, some incompatible with others,” then it seems that individuals and societies 
would find themselves “subject to conflicting claims of uncombinable, yet equally 
ultimate and objective, ends” (Berlin 2013: 83). As a result, a number of commentators 
have come to formulate value pluralism explicitly in terms of normative incoherence. 
Robert Talisse, for example, considers value pluralism as the thesis that “the moral facts 
are themselves in conflicts; consequently, there are a number of true moral propositions 
that nonetheless do not form a consistent set” (Talisse 2004: 128-129, emphasis added). 
According to Talisse’s formulation value pluralism does indeed entail the denial of 
normative holism. 
But the problem with this formulation is its ambiguity regarding the content of 
“moral facts” and “true moral propositions” that are presumably irreconcilable. “We 
ought to realize value A vis-à-vis value B in case x” and “We ought to realize value B 
vis-à-vis value A in case x” are indeed conflicting moral propositions, but “Value A is a 
genuine, ultimate good the sacrifice of which for the sake of the incompatible value B 
would be a great moral loss in case x” is by no means inconsistent with “Value B is a 
genuine, ultimate good the sacrifice of which for the sake of the incompatible value A 
would be a great moral loss in case x”. Value pluralism, however, commends only the 
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truth of the latter pair of propositions, but not that of the former. Hence no incoherence 
entailed. 
Value pluralism, in other words, is fully compatible with normative holism. There 
is no incoherence in valuing a variety of competing, non-reducible goods while 
painfully acknowledging that they cannot be realized all at the same time, without the 
sacrifice of one another. (In fact, it strikes me as evident that for anyone who rejects 
error theory and the emotivist account of morality, normative holism would be a truism.) 
But Dworkin asks for more than normative holism. According to Dworkin, not 
only must normative beliefs cohere, but values, once correctly interpreted, would cohere 
such that there could be no genuine conflict among them. Hence his revisionist 
definition of democracy, for example, as consisting of the institution of judicial review 
that purports to protect individual rights against majoritarian intrusion. 
The real dispute between Berlin and Dworkin, then, is not about whether we should 
accept coherentism in normative realm, to which Berlin has no objection, but about the 
usefulness of reinterpreting normative concepts, including those of value. For Berlin, 
although reflections on, and clarifications of, value-concepts are necessary in addressing 
normative issues36, there are certain points, certain limits imposed by the objective roots 
                                                          
36 To be sure, Berlin’s insistence on conceptual (over-)rigidity has long been a target of 
criticism. The various definitions he tried to give to negative freedom also indicates the need of 
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of our value-concepts, beyond which conceptual revisions would cease to be profitable, 
degenerate into arguments by definitional fiat, and become illusionary and self-
defeating. While, for example, “justice, happiness, love, the realization of capacities to 
create new things and experiences and ideas, the discovery of the truth” are no less 
ultimate values than freedom, “[nothing] is gained by identifying freedom proper, in 
either of its senses, with these values, or with the conditions of freedom, or by 
confounding types of freedom with one another” (2007: 48). Indeed, Dworkin’s 
interpretive project, in Berlin’s view, would be yet another instance of “[suppressing] 
one of the competing values altogether by pretending that it is identical with its rival – 
and so end by distorting both” (2007: 42). 
 
Incommensurability and Rational Adjudication 
 
If ultimate values may be genuinely incompatible, they are incommensurable as well, 
according to Berlin. The notion of incommensurability has given rise to a great deal of 
controversies, both on its interpretation and on its implication. Berlin in his work failed 
to offer a precise and consistent conceptualization of incommensurability, while 
                                                                                                                                                                             
greater room for conceptual interpretation and revision in his own thought. For discussions on 
this issue, see my essay on the negative/positive dichotomy of freedom. 
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subsequent authors have understood this concept in different ways (cf. Chang 2013; 
Crowder 2004: 127-128, 138-141; Gaus 2003: 32-39; Raz 1986: 321-366). Without 
going too much into textual details, however, I think t not unfair to summarize that, for 
Berlin as well as for many other value pluralists, if two values A and B are 
incommensurable, then neither will there be any “super-value” or “common 
denominator” C (for example, utility) in terms of which the relative worth of A and B 
can be measured and augmented on the same scale, nor will there be any universally 
applicable rule of ranking (such as lexical rules) that can determine the relative priority 
between A and B.37 
                                                          
37 To be sure, there are many other conceptions of inc mmensurability, and consequently many 
other versions of value pluralism. By offering the pr sent definition of incommensurability I by 
no means suggest that it is intrinsically “better” than other alternative conceptions. Instead, what 
I am doing here is try to present the strongest possible version of value pluralism that is 
compatible with liberalism. If this strong version of value pluralism can be shown to be 
compatible with liberalism, then all the weaker versions of value pluralism, with respective, less 
stringent definitions of incommensurability, would certainly be compatible with liberalism as 
well. For example, one could of course define incommensurability in such a way that values are 
said to be incommensurable when we have no basis to measure them even though we still can 
rank them. This definition of incommensurability is obviously weaker than the definition I offer, 
which denies the possibility of both measurement and r king. Or, to give another example, one 
might define value incommensurability simply as value infungibility, such that values are said 
to be incommensurable simply because the moral loss as ociated with the non-realization of a 
certain value cannot be cancelled by the moral gain associated with the realization of another 
value, regardless of whether they can be measured on the same scale. No more than affirming 
the tragic nature of value conflict, this conception of incommensurability is also much weaker 
than the one I offer. As long as the version of value pluralism built on the more stringent 
conception of incommensurability offered in this essay is proved to be compatible with 
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Understood in this way, the idea of value incommensurability immediately leads to 
two challenges to the viability of liberal pluralism. The first concerns whether value 
pluralism allows for rational adjudication among values38, while the second concerns 
whether it supports liberalism specifically. I will address the first challenge in the rest 
of this section, and turn to the second in the next. 
Let us begin with the first challenge. It is tempting to think that if two values are 
incommensurable, then there is no way at all to rationally adjudicate between them 
when they are in conflict. For, it might seem, any rational adjudication must be 
premised on certain common scale or shared rule of ranking, which in turn implies 
commensurability between the values to be adjudicated. As a consequence, if we are to 
make rational tradeoffs between values at all, we must reject the very idea of value 
incommensurability (cf. Kelly 2008). Otherwise we would have to give up the pretense 
of rational adjudication among values, making radical choice in every scenario of value 
conflict. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
liberalism, the compatibility of those weaker versions of value pluralism with liberalism are 
established too. 
38 Note that here the terms “rational” is not used in the narrow, instrumental sense of means-end 
calculation (as in, say, “rational choice theory”). Instead, by rationality I refer to the broader 
capacity to deliberate and make informed choices on the basis of facts as well as reasons, 




Obviously, if pluralists’ value judgments cannot be rational at all, then their liberal 
commitments would be severely undermined as well, since whenever liberal values and 
other incommensurable genuine values are in conflict, there would be no reason beyond 
one’s own preference (or mood at the time) to opt fr the former rather than the latter. 
So, before turning to the second concern about the specific relationship between value 
pluralism and liberalism, it is crucial to address whether, and to what extent, rational 
adjudication is possible in the face of value incommensurability. 
To be sure, many theorists have, in their own ways, rgued that the lack of a super-
value or rule of ranking does not by itself undermine the prospect of rational choice-
making (cf. Barry 1965: 6-8; Gaus 2003: 32; Larmore 1996: 160-162). Berlin’s 
argument is distinctive, however, in that it invokes a difference between guaranteed 
resolvability of value conflicts at the theoretical level, on the one hand, and their 
possibility of resolution at the practical level, on the other hand. According to Berlin, 
while it is true that “where ultimate values are irreconcilable, clear-cut solutions cannot, 
in principle, be found,” this is by no means “an argument against the proposition that 
the application of knowledge and skill can, in particular cases, lead to satisfactory 
solutions. When such dilemmas arise it is one thing to say that every effort must be 
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made to resolve them, and another that it is certain a priori that a correct, conclusive 
solution must always in principle be discoverable” (Berlin 2007: 42, emphasis added). 
We could, therefore, follow Jonathan Riley in calling Berlin’s value pluralism a 
“restrained” one. But it is restrained not because, as Riley suggested, it “recognizes that 
normal human beings always give moral priority to certain shared basic values,” which 
Riley takes to be negative liberties, “over competing values” (Riley 2013: 65). For, as I 
have argued in the previous section, the suggestion of such a clear-cut valuative 
hierarchy of priority runs afoul of deep value incompatibility. Rather, Berlin’s value 
pluralism is restrained because even though there is no clear-cut valuative hierarchy of 
priority among genuine competing values, it is nonetheless the case that the various 
value-systems and related policy choices, which are derived from those genuine values 
and embraced by different individuals and groups, may not be on a par. 
To begin with, as the Nazi example illustrates, some values-systems and policy 
choices may be derived in more defective or problematic ways from their respective 
grounding values than others are. And it is possible for those who are equipped with 
knowledge and skill relevant to a particular case, given a particular repertoire of 
practical options purporting to realize respective values, to tell rationally which one of 
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them is the least problematically derived, or would be the most adequate way of 
realizing its underlying values. 
Of course, the majority of cases involving value conflict are far more complicated 
than the Nazi example where it is easy, by means of the “application of knowledge and 
skill,” to point out the incorrectness in its inference from grounding values to practical 
conclusions, and then rule these options out straightforwardly from our repertoire. There 
are at least two kinds of complication. 
First, in many cases, it is clear that there are no significant flaws involved in 
competing practical options’ inference from their respective grounding values; and if 
value pluralists accept value incommensurability in the sense that no augmentation or 
ranking among ultimate values is possible, then it seems obvious that no rational 
solution in that particular case is possible either. Second, in many other cases, 
“conditions are often unclear, and principles incapable of being fully analysed or 
articulated” (Berlin 2007: 47, emphasis added), to the effect that we can neither 
calibrate the extent to which inferences are relatively problematic, nor determine the 
practical implications of those inferential problems. 
Value pluralists have developed various conceptual tools that can partly solved the 
first kind of cases. For example, according to Derek Parfit’s thesis of “imprecise 
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cardinal comparability” (Parfit 1986: 431; 2011: 566-569), when ultimate value V1 is 
neither better than, nor worse than, nor equally good as, ultimate value V2, they can 
nonetheless been “imprecisely” or “roughly” equal. Consequently, given a certain 
concrete context, x, a precise comparison between practical option X1, which would 
unproblematically realize or promote value V1 in context x, and practical option X2, 
which would unproblematically realize or promote value V2 in context x, may become 
possible, since the concrete context may result in a salient difference in the degree to 
which each practical option would realize or promote its respective value, hence “rough 
up” the cardinal ambiguities. In a similarly but more radical vein, Ruth Chang suggested 
that we embrace the concept of “parity” as a fourth category of evaluative comparability, 
that is, accept “A is on a par with B” as a sui generis relation vis-à-vis “A is better than 
B”, “ A is worse than B” and “A and B are equally good” (Chang 2002). Accordingly, if 
A and B are on a par then there is no truth about how they compare all things considered, 
even though A is surely better with respect to some considerations while B is surely 
better with respect to other considerations.39 In fact, despite their technical differences, 
                                                          
39 To be sure, there are many other proposals than Parfit’s nd Chang’s, such as understanding 
incommensurability in terms of vagueness (cf. Broome 1997). But the technical differences 




both Parfit’s and Chang’s solutions are in resonance with Berlin’s own view, who 
argued that “the concrete situation is almost everything” (Berlin 2013: 15). 
However, there still might be cases in which no such salient difference in the 
degree of value realization or promotion can be generated by the concrete context. 
Moreover, there are also cases of the second kind, discussed above, where conditions 
are too unclear for their potential consequences to be fully articulated, and for values on 
a par with each other to be compared and chosen with respect to relevant considerations. 
Both of them constitute hard cases in moral and political decisions. 
One might then be concerned that, even if the incommensurability thesis does not 
imply giving up rational solutions altogether, it nonetheless implies giving up rational 
solutions in hard cases, where ultimate values evidently conflict. Meanwhile, since hard 
cases are precisely where rational solutions and moral persuasions are the most relevant 
and most urgent, the practical implication of this thesis would be rather ironical: we 
should find rational solutions only where they are less relevant, and give them up when 
they are the most needed. 
This concern rests on a misunderstanding, however. Granted, if values are 
genuinely incompatible and incommensurable, then thre must be some cases where no 
rational solution exists, no matter in principle orin practice. Only monists like 
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“Condorcet and his disciples” would believe that in a y case the inability to find 
rational solutions could be attributed to “some defici ncy on our part which could be 
eliminated by an increase in skill or knowledge” (Berlin 2007: 42). Hence the 
application of knowledge and skill does have limits in solving certain cases. On the 
other hand, however, it is arguable (even though Berlin has not explicitly so argued) 
that, in accordance with value pluralism, we cannot know a priori which cases belong to 
this category either. That is, there is no principled way for us to determine which 
particular cases have rational solutions and which do not. 
Consequently, value pluralism does not necessarily imply that we should give up 
the hope for rational adjudication in any particular h rd case. On the contrary, it is well 
compatible with the suggestion that we make “every ffort” to acquire and apply 
“knowledge and skill,” as well as to reflect carefully and thoroughly, in every particular 
hard case, in search for its rational solution (or a proof that no rational solution exists in 
this particular case), without knowing a priori, in each case, either that such a solution 
exists or that such a proof of insolvability does.40 Value pluralism thus leaves open the 
                                                          
40 Here an interesting analogy could be made with Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem in 
mathematical logic, which, put simply, states that for any consistent system of axioms whose 
theorems can be listed by a mechanical method of alg rithm, there are always statements about 
the natural numbers that are both true and non-provable within the system. For the purpose of 
this paper, I leave aside the question of whether tis apparent similarity suggests anything about 
the relations between the ontological structure of values and that of numbers, or could 
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possibility for rational judgment in the face of inevitable tragic value conflicts, and to
that extent does not undermine the prospect for contextualized affirmation of liberal 
values in any practical case. 
 
Heterogeneous Modes of Value Instantiation 
 
Still, one might argue that even if, in every practical case, value incommensurability 
leaves open the possibility that liberal values be rationally chosen over their competing 
genuine values, liberalism requires more than that. Presumably a theory that counts as 
liberal should systematically accord liberal values a kind of political primacy, at least in 
all relevant cases, to the effect that the burden of justification is always on those who 
propose to prioritize other values over liberal ones, rather than the other way round. In 
other words, in order to be compatible with liberalism, value pluralism must guarantee 
that, in every relevant cases, contextualized affirmation of liberal values is not only 
possible, but also (at least prima facie) warranted. The problem is: how can this be done 
if genuine values are truly incommensurable? 
                                                                                                                                                                             
contribute to discussions on whether mathematics and logic and the right models of moral 
theory (cf. Lear 1988, Clarke-Doane 2012, Scanlon 2014). 
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To address this issue, let us first recall what the thesis of value pluralism says. It 
says that there are multiple (objective) ultimate values the pursuit of which is inherent 
in, and constitutive of, our common human nature. While the thesis of value pluralism 
does not itself commend a particular list of such ultimate values, there must be some 
other independent grounds for identifying the values that constitute the human horizon 
we have “consciously or unconsciously lived under.” 
To put in another way, the thesis of value pluralism (or the acceptance of it) plays 
a different role than identifying (and adding to the list) particular values. For example, 
suppose we have, for independent reasons, come to id ntify V1, V2 and V3 as on the list 
of ultimate values that are constitutive of human nature, then the acceptance of value 
pluralism would entail (rather than justify) the acceptance of V1, V2 and V3 as equally 
ultimate yet incommensurable values. Whereas value p ralism presumes that none of 
them ought to be suppressed beyond a certain point for the sake of realizing other 
values, it does not generate the value of either V1, V2 or V3 in the sense that it renders 
any of them ranked higher in a valuative hierarchy, and hence in principle more 
valuable, than others. 
Berlin sometimes seems to suggest otherwise, as he rgues that it is the acceptance 
of value pluralism that leads men to recognize the “c ntral importance of,” and to 
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“place… immense value upon,” freedom of choice, and declares that the “necessity of 
choosing between absolute claims” – as “an inescapable characteristic of the human 
condition” – “gives its value to freedom … as an end in itself, and not as a temporary 
need, arising out of our confused notions and irration l and disordered lives, a 
predicament which a panacea could one day put right” (Berlin 2007: 214, emphasis 
added). Accordingly, freedom of choice is justified, and accorded value, after (and on 
the basis of) the acceptance of value pluralism, rathe  than before (or independently of) 
it. 
This understanding rests, however, on a confusion about the role value pluralism 
plays in the justification and valuation of freedom f choice. For any claim or good, its 
status as an ultimate, basic human value must be justified on the basis of its being “an 
inalienable ingredient in what makes human beings human,” of its being constitutive of 
the human horizon that we have “consciously or uncons iously lived under.” Value 
pluralism is not the source of any such value, but affirmation of it. It acknowledges the 
(meta)normative distinctness of each of these values vis-à-vis others, such that they are 
not to be subsumed under the name of other basic values. 
Value pluralism, in other words, cannot “give its value to” the freedom to choose. 
To the extent that the latter is an ultimate value at all, its value must be presumed, rather 
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than justified, by the acceptance of a list of plura , irreducible and incommensurable 
basic human values, among which the freedom to choose is included, as “an inalienable 
ingredient in what makes human beings human.” This is so because what is “an 
inescapable characteristic of the human condition” is not merely that choices among 
ultimate values are unavoidable, but that the freedom to choose constitutes part of our 
common human horizon, something we cannot conceive of away “as [a presupposition] 
of being human at all, of living in a common world with others, of recognising them, 
and being ourselves recognised, as persons” (Berlin 2013: 216). Notice that this is a 
normative premise, not a descriptive one, and does not fall prey to the naturalistic 
fallacy. 
But if the acknowledgement of value pluralism does not “give its value to” 
freedom of choice, how, then, can it help distinguish the latter from other basic values, 
such that an emphasis on liberal values could possibly follow? The answer, I argue, lies 
in the difference between two notions: a valuative hierarchy among basic human values, 
on the one hand, and the modal heterogeneity of their practical instantiations (and hence 
the modal specialty of each of them), on the other hand. 
To be sure, value pluralism does not “add” any value to freedom of choice, to the 
effect that it is ranked higher than other basic values in a valuative hierarchy, be it in the 
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form of in-principle utility difference, or a Rawlsian lexical order, or else. After all, all 
basic values are supposedly equally valid, and as such incommensurable. Nonetheless, 
as I have argued, Berlin allows for the comparison among respective instantiations of 
values in concrete cases, which is different from comparing values as such. And value 
pluralists could argue that, because different basic values represent different aspects or 
facets of our common human horizon, the ways in which they instantiate in human 
practices also differ. This, in turn, implies that different values might be best protect, 
promoted or realized by different types of practices, and at different levels of choice-
making. Finally, liberal pluralists could argue that, in some concrete cases, the 
application of knowledge and skills may lead rationally to a conclusive judgment that 
liberal values, because of certain features of their modes of instantiation, should be 
accorded more weights than other basic, incommensurable values, with regard to their 
protection, promotion, or realization at the institutional level. 
To illustrate the heterogeneity with respect to modes of value instantiation, 
consider several examples of basic values41, such as courage (cf. Dent 1981), love, the 
discovery of the truth (cf. Berlin 2007: 48), the securing of order (cf. Williams 2005: 3), 
                                                          
41 Or: examples of what have been widely regarded as basic values. Surely there are possible 
objections to count any of them as a basic value, or ven as a value. It is, however, not my aim 
in this essay to produce a definitive list of basic values. 
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and the freedom to choose. While courage is, according to many, an “executive virtue” 
that enables someone “effectively to plan and execute his purposes” (Dent 1981: 574), 
the discovery of the truth is an achievement, a purpose to be planned and executed. At 
the same time, both of them are different from the value of love in that the latter is 
essentially relational and interactional, that is, it can be realized only in relations and 
interactions between agents, or (metaphorically) betwe n agents and their beloved 
objects. In addition, while the securing of order is also relational and interactional, it is 
different from love in certain other aspects. For example, whereas love is usually left to 
individual pursuit, order can only be promoted collectively, given the complications of 
cooperation and defection involved. 
By the same token, the freedom to choose is both similar to and distinct from other 
values in many aspects. To begin with, like any other basic human value, freedom of 
choice is intrinsically valuable. If the value of courage is not exhausted by its being an 
“executive virtue,” but “is, as such, a human excellence, regardless of whether or not 
some further end be better accomplished by this” (Dent 1981: 575), then similarly, the 
value of freedom does not reside merely in the specific things to be freely chosen, but is 
also a “non-specific value”  (cf. Carter 1999; Dowding & van Hees 2007: 150).  A free 
choice does not necessarily lead to the realization of any other value as an achievement; 
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instead, it might well lead to the realization of certain disvalue, and consequently 
implies a conflict between freedom as a value, on the one hand, and the corresponding 
value of the realized disvalue, on the other hand. 
In contrast to the “executive virtue” of courage, however, freedom is not merely a 
psychological disposition across virtuous persons, but the state of both opportunities 
presented to, and constraints imposed on, the choices of relevant agents. Like love and 
order, freedom has a relational and interactional dimension, as violations of one’s 
freedom to choose often consist in human interventions on her choices. In addition, 
since one’s choices often impose externalities on others, affecting the latter’s freedom to 
choose, the need for coordination and regulation is apparent. Consequently, in a society 
consisting of a multitude of persons, the securing of freedom, like the securing of order 
and unlike the attainment of love, is necessarily a matter that has to be dealt with at the 
collective level. 
But there are also crucial differences between freedom, on the one hand, and order, 
as well as some other values the securing of which requires collective action, on the 
other hand. For one thing, the value of freedom is as ociated with the very act of 
choice-making in a way other values, including order, are not. Whereas the substantive 
content of a choice may result in consequences that affect either the overall freedom or 
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the overall order of a society, freedom is at the same time distinctively instantiated in 
the form of the choice, or the way in which the choice is made, as well: for example, 
whether it is made under coercion, whether it is informed and deliberate, and so on. Put 
another way, freedom has a distinct mode of instantiation vis-à-vis many other values, 
including order. 
Moreover, notice that order consists in the obtainme t of “ascertainable patterns of 
regular structure, process, or change occurring in and resulting from human interaction” 
(Gould & Kolb, 1964: 660), and the resulted stability and predictability conducive to 
effective planning and execution of one’s plans. Such patterns must be robust enough 
such that only a small category of actions, with a significant degree of impact, could 
pose threat to them. As a consequence, once order is in place, its maintenance becomes 
a matter of concern only in relatively few instances of actions. By contrast, freedom is 
not only a property of the system of rules and patterns under which choices and actions 
are made, but also a property of those choices and actions themselves. Whenever a 
choice or an action is made, the value of freedom is at stake. This suggests that, in 
contrast to order (and many other ultimate values) the claim of which is relevant – and 
hence ought to be taken as a weighty consideration – ly in a particular set of contexts, 
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we not only ought to take the freedom to choose as a weighty consideration in concrete 
cases, but also ought to do it in a generalized way. 
To further illustrate the idea of modal heterogeneity of value instantiation, let us 
use a mathematical analogy. Consider the following function, f (a, b, c, d) = (ab + c) d. 
In this function, both variables a and b are factors in the operation of multiplication 
with each other, but none of them can by itself be a t rm in an operation of addition. By 
contrast, both ab, which is the product of a and b, and c are terms in the operation of 
addition with each other, but they can only be multiplied with each other when d
satisfies certain conditions. Finally, d is the only variable that serves as an exponent in 
this function, with ab + c, the sum of ab and c, as its only base in the operation of 
exponentiation. In a nutshell, different variables have different roles to play in the 
operations of this function, and hence different relations with one another as well. 
Now what the idea of modal heterogeneity of value instantiation suggests is this. 
Even if values were commensurable (say by their “utilities”), the rational adjudication of 
their tradeoff still could have not taken the simple form of addition and subtraction. 
Instead, operations of multiplication and exponentiation between values would have 
been involved, and, given different values’ modes of instantiation, probably the factors 
or exponents in those operations would have always been some values but not others. 
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Suppose, for example, three ultimate values – freedom, order, and the discovery of 
truth – are now in conflict and we need to make a tradeoff. Suppose further, for the sake 
of argument, that they are commensurable by their respective “utilities” – Uf, Uo, and 
Udt. One might think that the overall utility of a tradeoff could be calibrated 
straightforwardly by augmentation, e.g., U = kUf + mUo + nUdt, where k, m, and n vary 
in accordance with the decided tradeoff point. However, in the light of the above 
observation that the value of freedom is instantiated not only in the content of a choice 
but also in its form, and that it is weighty in a generalized rather than confined way, it 
would be much more plausible to assume that the overall utility should be calibrated by 
a more complex function, such as U = (mUo + nUdt) 
kUf , where k, m, and n vary in 
accordance with the decided tradeoff point. In thisalternative function, the “utility” of 
freedom plays the role of an exponent, whereas the um of the “utility” of order and that 
of the discovery of truth plays the role of a base. 
To be sure, the mathematical analogy of modal heterogeneity has its limits. For one 
thing, as I have said, value pluralists hold that ultimate values are incommensurable, 
and therefore that no precise “utilities” of ultimate values can be predetermined in order 
to calibrate and compare the overall utilities of tradeoff points. Nonetheless, the 
takeaway is clear, which is that modes of instantiation may affect the ways in which 
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relevant values ought to be weighed in particular contexts of practice, and that the 
modal specialty of freedom may grant it a distinctive role vis-à-vis other values at 
certain level of decision-making. 
Indeed, given the generalized weightiness of the fre dom to choose as well as its 
collective dimension, it could be argued that, when deliberating politically about the 
proper forms of protecting or promoting basic values, we may accord such freedom a 
special institutional role. For instance, we may, as Berlin suggested, dmarcate the 
“frontiers” of an “area” of negative liberties, whic  other persons and agents ought not 
to trespass “under normal conditions” (Berlin 2007: 52). Such a special institutional role, 
again, does not imply that freedom has any advantage in a supposed valuative hierarchy 
over other presumably incommensurable basic values; instead, it is meant to reflect the 
special mode in which freedom is instantiated. 
Admittedly, the above account of the modal specialty of freedom and its 
institutional role is quite sketchy. In the next essay, I will argue for it in greater details 
through comparisons with several other approaches of justifying liberal pluralism, and 







Value Pluralism, Liberal Democracy, and Political Judgment 
 
In the previous essay, I have elaborated on several k y concepts of value pluralism, and 
introduced the notions of modal heterogeneity and modal specialty that are central to 
my account of the compatibility between liberalism and value pluralism. Much, to be 
sure, is left to be done in filling out the details of this account. 
Some of these tasks will be fulfilled in this essay. In the first place, I will 
summarize the two basic difficulties faced by liberal pluralists, and the ways in which 
existing approaches fail to solve them. I will then show how my modal account of value 
pluralism passes those two tests. Finally, I will explore three main political implications 
of my account, which concern, first, the tradeoff between civil liberties and other social 
goods, second, the relationship between liberalism and democracy, and third, the roles 





Defending Liberal Pluralism: Two Problems and Their Solutions 
 
Liberal pluralists have developed various accounts of how the tension between value 
pluralism and liberalism can be solved. While different accounts may have to address 
different technical issues of their own, there are two basic difficulties they all must 
overcome, which we may dub the Jump Problem and the Trump Problem, respectively. 
 
Berlin’s Argument from Choice 
To illustrate, consider first of all the so-called “argument from choice,” which 
Berlin offered toward the end of “Two Concepts of Liberty”: 
 
The world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are 
faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, 
the realization of some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others. 
Indeed, it is because this is their situation that men place such immense value 
upon the freedom to choose; for if they had assurance that in some perfect state, 
realizable by men on earth, no ends pursued by themwould ever be in conflict, 
the necessity and agony of choice would disappear, and with it the central 
importance of the freedom to choose. (Berlin 2007: 213-214) 
 
This argument was the prototype of many subsequent, more sophisticated defenses for 
liberal pluralism. But as many critics have pointed out, it has at least two serious flaws. 
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First, it proceeds from the factual premise that conflicts among equally ultimate 
claims are inevitable, to the normative conclusion that the freedom to choose between 
them is, or ought to be taken as, immensely valuable. Obviously, such an inference 
commits the naturalistic fallacy and is therefore invalid. An entirely contrary conclusion 
might as well be consistent with the premise. For example, instead of valuing the 
freedom to choose, one could have come to the following conclusion: “Since choices 
among incommensurable claims are always tragic and painful, we ought to avert from 
the ‘agony of choice’ as far as possible, by handing away our opportunities to make 
choices, and hence our negative liberties as a whole, t  some moral or political 
authorities.” 
In a nutshell, the inevitability and tragedy of conflicts among ultimate claims 
cannot by itself establish any normative conclusion, including the conclusion that we 
ought to place immense value upon the freedom to cho se between those claims.42 Call 
                                                          
42 Also, Berlin’s statement in the quoted passage that “it is because this is their situation that 
men place such immense value upon the freedom to cho se” seems to suggest that freedom is 
valuable only because the plurality of values makes choice between them necessary, that is, the 
status of freedom being a ultimate value is contingent on the truth of value pluralism vis-à-vis 
monism, which would, according to this view, necessarily take freedom as an purely 
instrumental value. Cf. Berlin (2002: 43-44): “The n ed to choose, to sacrifice some ultimate 
values to others, turns out to be a permanent charateristic of the human predicament. If this is 
so, it undermines all theories according to which the value of free choice derives from the fact 
that without it we cannot attain to the perfect life; with the implication that once such perfection 
has been reached the need for choice between alternatives withers away.” But this view is 
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it the Jump Problem, as the “argument from choice” relies on a logical jump from a 
factual premise to a normative conclusion, which makes its defense for liberal pluralism 
void. 
But even if we could revise this argument, perhaps by introducing some additional 
normative premises, to avoid the naturalistic fallacy and hence the Jump Problem, it 
would still not be a working argument for liberal pluralism. In fact, it would only do a 
disservice to the latter. For, according to this argument, one who recognizes the fact of 
value conflict has an extra reason to “place immense value upon,” and to grant “central 
importance” to, the freedom to choose between those fir t-order values that are in 
conflict with one another. As a consequence, while the freedom to choose is itself an 
ultimate value, it is now privileged over other presumably equally genuine values. Or as 
Robert Talisse out it, this line of argument implicit y acknowledges “autonomous choice 
as a kind of trumping value that can break the deadlock between otherwise competing 
values” (Talisse 2004: 135). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
clearly wrong, and can be seen as another exemplification of the naturalistic fallacy. Critics 
have pointed out that monism is not incompatible with taking freedom as intrinsically valuable 
(cf. Dworkin 2011). Indeed, as I have argued in thepr vious essay, we must separate the 




This is the second major problem with the “argument from choice”: it upsets the 
very thesis of value pluralism, running afoul of its promise of value incommensurability. 
In doing so, the supposed inference, from value pluralism to liberalism, becomes self-
defeating. Call it the Trump Problem, as the argument paradoxically relies on freedom 
trumping other, supposedly equally genuine, ultimate values. 
It is evident that the Jump Problem and the Trump Problem, are not confined to 
Berlin’s argument, but pose a threat to the idea of liberal pluralism in general. Solving 
them is a litmus test for the plausibility of accounts of how value pluralism and 
liberalism are compatible with each other. Subsequent defenders of liberal pluralism are 
aware of this, and have tried to develop accounts that could pass the test. In one way or 
another, however, they all fail. In the following, I will take as examples two most recent 
attempts, by George Crowder and William Galston respectively, and examine their 
failures, before turning to demonstrate the viability of my modal account of liberal 





Crowder’s Proposal of Pluralist Virtues 
Recognizes that Berlin’s “argument from choice,” in its original form, suffers from 
the naturalistic fallacy, George Crowder proposes an amendment of it that essentially 
appeals to the idea of “pluralist virtues”: 
 
Pluralism imposes hard choices on us. To cope well ith those choices, we 
need to develop certain dispositions of character, or virtues. Those virtues 
overlap the character traits distinctively promoted by liberal forms of politics, 
in particular the exercise of personal autonomy. In short, liberalism promotes 
the virtues required for coping successfully with the exigencies of choosing 
among conflicting incommensurables. (Crowder 2004: 164) 
 
He then goes on to identify four “pluralist values” that are required for such success: 
first, generosity or open-mindedness in “taking plural values seriously”; second, a sense 
of reality concerning “the real costs of  moral and political decisions”; third, 
attentiveness “to the relevant details of the choice situation, including the claims and 
circumstances of those people affected by the choice”; and fourth, flexibility “in 
tailoring [one’s] judgment closely to the situation to which [one attends],” which he 




Crowder believes that this proposal avoids the naturalistic fallacy because it 
“passes not from necessity to value but from necessity to necessity” (Crowder 2004: 
164). To say that pluralist virtues are necessary for us to cope well with hard choices, he 
argues, is no more than to say that they are necessary for us “to choose for a good 
reason.” For, insofar as practical reasoning is indispensible in organizing choices among 
incommensurable goods, under pluralism its absence would render our choices 
“arbitrary, incoherent and perhaps self-defeating”; and the only practice that is non-
arbitrary and coherent under pluralism is to take seriously all the goods that one 
purports to value (Crowder 2004: 165). In the end, “value pluralism imposes on us 
choices that are demanding to a degree such that they can be made well only by 
autonomous agents… informed by critical choices among the available options” 
(Crowder 2004: 168). 
Unfortunately this proposal does not work. To begin with, it is far from obvious 
that the proposed pluralist virtues are n cessary for preventing “arbitrary, incoherent 
and perhaps self-defeating” choices and hence for “c ping well” under pluralism. Take 
the first virtue Crowder proposed – generosity or open-mindedness in taking seriously 
plural values – for example. Recall Du Bois’ famous self-appraisal: “Because I am a 
negro I lose something of that breadth of view which the more cosmopolitan races have, 
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and with this goes an intensity of feeling and conviction which both wins and repels 
sympathy, and now enlightens, now puzzles” (Du Bois 2007: 206, emphases added). 
According to Du Bois, for members of disadvantaged an discriminated groups, usually 
open-mindedness can be maintained only at the expense of the intensity of conviction, 
an important source for motivating fights against social injustice. Both open-
mindedness and commitment are admirable, but one canot always have both. To say 
that open-mindedness is necessary for coping well, then, is to deny the reasonableness 
and virtuosity of the Du Boisian way of coping with hard choices. 
Similar things can be said about other pluralist vir ues Crowder proposes, too. 
While a sense of reality probably is a virtuous trait in many cases, it is arguable that, 
given our innate cognitive imperfections such as the status quo bias, an (over-)emphasis 
on the cultivation of a sense of reality would produce a widespread conservative 
tendency, and would, from time to time, need to be balanced by ostensibly unrealistic or 
utopian visionaries who constantly push the envelope f our moral, cultural, social and 
political imaginations. By the same token, while atten iveness to details of the choice 
situation is praiseworthy, taking it as a necessary virtue ignores the possibility of cope 
well with hard choices by appealing to heuristics in tead of meticulous detail-seeking. 
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The problem looms the largest in Crowder’s characteization of the last pluralist 
virtue, flexibility, and its connection to the liberal ideal of autonomy: “To judge flexibly 
in the light of value pluralism is to judge for one’s own reasons in a strong sense, that is, 
autonomously. In part this is because conflicts among incommensurable goods cannot 
be decided for good reason merely by the mechanical application of a standard monist 
rule” (Crowder 2004: 167). One of the implications of this characterization is that 
utilitarians are not flexible and hence not autonomous, because utilitarian calculation is 
certainly “mechanical application” of a “ready-made monist procedure” (Crowder 2004: 
167). This is a shocking suggestion, however. It seems that Crowder conflates giving a 
right reason (in accordance with value pluralism) with giving a good reason. It is one 
thing to say that value pluralism is true and that utilitarianism is wrong. It is quite 
another to say that one has no good reason at all, or cannot “cope well,” in committing 
to utilitarianism, or that one is heteoronomous if he relies on the “ready-made monist 
procedure” of utilitarian calculation. So long as one’s utilitarianism is the result of her 
careful and informed (if ultimately wrong) reflection, calling it heteoronomous would 




All the above criticisms point to a more fundamental flaw of Crowder’s proposal, 
which is that it assumes a overly restrictive conception of what makes a choice, or an 
approach to making choices, a good one, and as a result unreflectively precludes diverse 
alternative ways of coping and living with hard choices under pluralism. In other words, 
the proposal does not, as he claimed, pass “from necessity to necessity.” It commits the 
naturalistic fallacy and fails the Jump Test just as did the original Berlinian argument. 
 
Galston’s Presumption of Expressive Liberty 
William Galston tells a different story about how value pluralism and liberalism 
get along. Under value pluralism, he argues, “there is a range of indeterminacy within 
which various choices are rationally defensible” and “no single uniquely rational 
ordering or combination” of ultimate values available. Since “no one can provide a 
generally valid reason, binding on all individuals, for a particular ranking or 
combination,” any coercive policy “whose justification includes the assertion that there 
is a unique rational ordering of value” must be rejected (Galston 2002: 57-58). 
Galston acknowledges that this argument assumes “coercion always stands 
exposed to a potential demand for justification.” But he does not think this assumption 
particularly troubling, because “coercion is not a fact of nature, nor is it self-justifying. 
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Just the reverse: There is a presumption against it, grounded in the pervasive human 
desire to go our own way in accordance with our own desires and beliefs” (Galston 
2002: 58). He calls it the presumption of “expressive l berty,” which is defined as “the 
absence of constraints, imposed by some individuals on others, that make it impossible 
(or significantly more difficult) for the affected individuals to live their lives in ways 
that express their deepest beliefs about what gives m aning or value to life” (Galston 
2002: 28). 
Constituting “the portion of negative liberty that bears directly on questions of 
identity” (Galston 2002: 28n1), expressive liberty lies in the core of liberal values. In a 
nutshell, according to Galston, value pluralism’s exclusion of unique rational ordering 
as justification for coercive policies, on the one hand, and the pervasiveness of the 
desire for expressive liberty presumed against coerci n, on the other hand, in 
combination provide a firm ground for liberalism. 
In appealing to “the pervasive human desire to go our own way” as a presumption 
against coercion, however, Galston risks inheriting the naturalistic fallacy of Berlin’s 
argument from choice. After all, not all pervasive d sires deserve accommodation. The 
mere fact that the desire for expressive liberty is pervasive does not by itself constitute a 
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reason for giving such desire normative weight and presuming it against the justification 
of state coercion. 
To be sure, Galston could have filled the gap by supplying a normative argument 
about the significance of expressive liberty, in addition to the pervasiveness of the 
desire for it. But then he would have been trapped by the Trump Problem while 
escaping the Jump Problem. Robert Talisse has nicely summarized the dilemma Galston 
faces: 
  
The liberal again can give a strong account of why t e desire to live in 
“accordance with our own desires and beliefs” ought to be accommodated. 
Such a story will draw upon the over-riding value of autonomy, derived 
generally from the need to feel that one’s life is valuable from the inside. That 
is, the liberal can countenance autonomous choice as a kind of trumping value 
that can break the deadlock between otherwise competing values; on this 
picture, that a given individual perceives a way of life based on Millian civic 
liberty as choice-worthy contributes to the value of that way of life for that 
individual. However, this line of argument is not open to the value pluralist, for 
it involves the claim that autonomous choice is a trumping value, and that 
consequently goods can be rank ordered. (Talisse 2004: 135) 
 
This is not only Galston’s own dilemma, of course, but a common challenge faced by 
all liberal pluralists. How can one justify the special normative status granted to 
freedom (or the like) in liberal theory without contradicting the value pluralist thesis 





Modal Heterogeneity, the Modal Specialty of Freedom, and the Limited Role of Value 
Pluralism 
The modal account of value pluralism I have laid out in the previous essay can 
solve the above difficulties. The basic idea is this. Different basic values represent 
different aspects or facets of our common human horizon, and may therefore have 
different modes of instantiation in human practices, r ulting in modal heterogeneity of 
value instantiation. While all basic values are thems lves incommensurable, we 
arguably ought to accord different weights to the instantiations of those values in a 
particular practical context, in accordance with the relevance of their respective modes 
to the issue at hand. The fact that in a particular context, c, the instantiation of value V1 
is accorded greater weight than that of V2 does not mean that V1 “trumps” V2. Instead, it 
only means that V1’s mode of instantiation is more relevant to context c than is V2’s, 
allowing the possibility that the instantiation of V2 would be accorded greater weight 
than that of V1 in a different context c* to which V2’s mode of instantiation is more 
relevant. There is no valuative hierarchy – be it in the form of in-principle utility 
difference, or a Rawlsian lexical order, or else – between V1 and V2, which remain 
incommensurable. It is the difference between the specific modes in which V1 and V2 
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are instantiated, respectively, that affects our practical adjudication between them in a 
given context. 
If this is the case, we do not need to appeal, as Talisse suggested, to a “strong 
account” of the “over-riding value of autonomy,” or “the claim that autonomous choice 
is a trumping value,” which contradicts the value pluralist notion of incommensurability, 
in order to justify the presumption against state co r ion. On the contrary, a different 
line of reasoning is now open to value pluralists, which is that freedom’s mode of 
instantiation is more relevant than many other values’ in those contexts where decisions 
about matters of collective, political nature, especially matters of institutional design 
with regard to the exercises and limits of state power, are of primary concern. As a 
consequence, its instantiation ought to be accorded generally greater (though cardinally 
imprecise43) weight than many others’ in those contexts and with regard to those matters. 
I have talked about the modal specialty of freedom vis-à-vis other basic values in 
the last two essays, and will recap some of the points here. To begin with, unlike many 
other basic values, freedom is instantiated not through the substantive content of a 
particular choice that is freely made, but in the way in which the choice is made, which 
means, first of all, that whenever a choice or an action is made, the value of freedom is 
                                                          
43 See discussions on various interpretation of value incommensurability in the second essay. 
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at stake. Therefore, in contrast to many other basic values, the claim of any of which is 
relevant only in a small set of choice situations where it is the purported consequence of 
the choice to be made or the action to be performed, the freedom to choose is a 
generally pertinent concern across all concrete cases. Moreover, it also means that, in 
contrast to individual judgments and decisions concerning which choices and actions to 
make in personal lives, collective ones about regulating the externalities generated by 
those choices and actions, as well as about the limits of such regulation, are contexts in 
which the instantiation of freedom should be given greater weight. For it is these 
collective judgments and decisions that define the ways in which we make individual 
choices and actions, through the substantive contents of which many other basic values 
are then instantiated. 
As a result, the presumption against state coercion is jointly established, on the one 
hand, by means of the general pertinence of freedom, which explains why it is a 
presumption at all, and on the other hand, by means of the collective dimension of the 
instantiation of freedom, which relates to the nature of state coercion as collective 
policy. The presumption does not need to be grounded on the traditional liberal idea of 
autonomy as a trumping or over-riding value. On the contrary, it suffices to appeal to 
the idea of modal heterogeneity of value instantiation, and to the special mode of 
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freedom vis-à-vis other basic, incommensurable values. I will say more about this in the 
next section. 
If the modal account of liberal pluralism solves the Trump Problem by appealing to 
the distinction between modal heterogeneity and valuative hierarchy, it also solves the 
Jump Problem by acknowledging – as I have argued in the previous essay – that value 
pluralism (or the acceptance of it) plays a different role than identifying any particular 
basic value or justifying a certain definitive list of basic values. The acceptance of value 
pluralism entails that, if we have, for good reasons, come to identify V1, V2 and V3 as on 
the list of basic values that are constitutive of human nature, then we must acknowledge 
that V1, V2 and V3 are equally genuine, ultimately incompatible, and i commensurable. 
To put it in another way, value pluralism is not the source of any basic value, but 
merely an affirmation of its value-status. It acknowledges the (meta)normative 
distinctness of each of these values vi -à-vis others, such that they are not to be 
subsumed under the name of other basic values. To identify basic values or to justify a 
definitive list of basic values, on the other hand, we must supply independent reasons 
for each of them. 
By acknowledging the limited role of value pluralism, defenders of liberal 
pluralism can disentangle two tasks from each other. One is to demonstrate the 
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compatibility between liberalism and value pluralism. The other is to account for the 
value of freedom, that is, why freedom is valuable at all (and why liberalism is right) in 
the first place. The latter is a common challenge for all strands of liberalism, whereas 
the former task is specifically for liberal pluralists and to that extent ought to be their 
primary concern. 
Berlin’s and Crowder’s approaches failed the Jump Test because they were eager 
to accomplish the two tasks at once, and so tried to infer the value of freedom directly 
from the fact of value pluralism. Galston’s approach risked failing the Jump Test too 
insofar as he suggested that the value of freedom be presumed solely on the basis of the 
pervasive desire for it, which is a sheer fact. It could be rescued from the risk by an 
argument for the presumption against state coercion, which cannot be based on the 
traditional liberal appeal to the trumping value of autonomy. The idea of modal 
specialty of freedom solves this problem and thus reconciles liberalism with value 
pluralism. 
Notice, however, that it leaves the question of why freedom is, in the first place, 
valuable at all still unaddressed. As I have suggested, this question can only be 
addressed by looking into additional facts and reasons that are independent from the 
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thesis of value pluralism, including facts about basic human conditions that inform 
various aspects of the common human horizon. 
But this does not make the modal account of liberal pluralism problematic. For, on 
the one hand, non-pluralist liberal accounts also face the equally intriguing question of 
why autonomy is valuable – and trumping – at all. So in this regard liberal pluralism 
does not have any comparative disadvantage vis-à-vi other strands of liberalism. On 
the other hand, as I have argued in the previous essay, the making of a case for liberal 
pluralism is an art of persuasive elaboration. Given that the compatibility problem 
between liberalism and value pluralism has been solved, insofar as we can, on the basis 
of the modal account, persuasively elaborate the distinctiveness and significance of the 
political implications of liberal pluralism vis-à-vis other strands of liberalism, this fact 
would count heavily in favor of the modal account of liberal pluralism. 
 
Political Implications of Liberal Pluralism 
 
In the rest of this essay, I will discuss three political implications of the modal account 
of liberal pluralism. The first concerns the nature of the so-called “negative” area of 
civil liberties and its demarcation, whereas the other two implications of the modal 
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account pertain to the place of democracy and that of political judgment, respectively, in 
liberal political theory. As will be shown, those three issues are closely interconnected, 
together manifesting both the possibility and the intricacy of rational adjudication of 
value conflict in political life, in the face of the incommensurability of genuine basic 
values. 
 
Civil Liberties in the Balance 
In the previous section, I have argued that the modal account of liberal pluralism 
can, without resorting to the idea of autonomy as atrumping value, establish the general 
pertinence of freedom to all collective decisions and hence th presumption against 
state coercion. As a result, in the political life, the burden of justification generally falls 
on those who propose to compromise liberal values for the sake of other goods and 
claims, rather than the other way around. 
But of course this is far from the end of the story. For one thing, those who commit 
to liberalism presumably embrace not only such a presumption against state coercion, 
but a sufficiently strong one, to the effect that the rights and liberties liberals cherish, 
while not absolute or inviolable, will not be too easily overridden by other goods and 
claims in each particular case of collective decision-making. Hence the famous 
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metaphor of an “‘negative’ area” of civil liberties, the “frontiers” of which, “under 
normal conditions,” are too “sacred” to “overstep” (Berlin 2007: 52-53). On the other 
hand, as most liberal theorists would agree, the presumption should not be too rigid 
either, but should leave reasonable room for necessary tradeoffs and balances between 
civil liberties and other important values.44 
Furthermore, the search for proper criteria for such tradeoffs and balances cannot 
be undertaken independently of a deeper issue, namely, the tension between the 
ostensibly deontological discourse of rights and liberties, on the one hand, and the 
                                                          
44 Here the term “balance” is to be understood in a broad rather than narrow sense. On the face 
of it, the talk of balancing is not particularly welcomed among liberal thinkers. Many have 
warned that in real-world political discourses “the m taphor of balancing is a rhetorical device 
of which one must be extremely wary” (Ashworth & Redmayne 2010: 41-42), as it, among 
other things, allows political and judicial decision-makers to “unconsciously smuggle in their 
political preferences as they evaluate the interests and figure out which ones are weightier than 
others” (Tushnet 1999: 133). In particular, Jeremy Waldron (2003) has nicely summarized 
various reasons for worrying about the post-9/11 talk of “balance between liberty and security,” 
while Mark Neocleous (2007) offered a Foucaultian ge ealogical critique of liberalism in terms 
of its long-standing ambiguity towards the idea of such balance. Nevertheless, many of those 
concerns are about “balance” in a narrow sense, or, in Waldron’s words, “the sort of common-
or-garden consequentialism” according to which the costs and benefits of liberty and security 
(or other goods) can be straightforwardly calculated, added and subtracted (Waldron 2003: 194). 
But this need not be the case for all conceptions of balancing. Indeed, there might be other, 
more sophisticated ways of conceiving the trade-off and balance between liberties and other 
values – a possibility all these authors acknowledge, whether they use the term “balance” to 
characterize it or not. Under the broader sense of tradeoff and balance, one is allowed to use, for 
example, the more sensible approach of “probability threshold” that takes into account the 
likelihood of a potential threat to security and sets a stringent floor on it in order to counter the 
otherwise systematic overestimation of threats (cf. Masur 2007). 
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ostensibly consequentialist notion of trading off and balancing, on the other hand. 
Jeremy Waldron, for example, has suggested that “[t] lk of balance – particularly talk of 
changes in the balance as circumstances and consequences change – may not be 
appropriate in the realm of  civil liberties. Civil liberties are associated with rights, and 
rights-discourse is often resolutely anti-consequentialist” (Waldron 2003: 194). Given 
such a tension, before we could demarcate the “frontiers” of negative liberties and lay 
out the terms under which to “overstep” them is justified, it would be necessary to ask 
how talk of “demarcating” and “overstepping” the “frontiers” of negative liberties, both 
premised on the consequentialist notion of tradeoff, is meaningful at all. 
Some might think that this tension can be solved by threshold deontology (cf. 
Kamm 2007; Moore 1997; Zamir & Medina 2010: 41-56), the idea that deontological 
constraints have primacy over the goodness of outcomes only when the weight of the 
latter is below a certain threshold, and that otherwise those constraints are overridden. 
Whatever the appeal of threshold deontology is, however, the modal account of value 
pluralism could help explain it (or explain it away)45 while at the same time avoid the 
                                                          
45 While I do not have room to argue for this here, I believe that the implication of value 
pluralism is broadly consequentialist at the practical level (even though, as I have shown in the 
previous essay, value pluralists should reject all uti itarian variants of consequentialism as 
monist and therefore metaphysically incorrect). In fact, I believe that the consequentialism-
versus-deontology debate is largely misplaced, that we should distinguish between questions 
about the nature of normative assessment at the practical level and questions about the 
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difficulties threshold deontology faces. To begin with, in response to the charge of 
incoherence, threshold deontologists argue that there are more than one kind of morally 
relevant factors, that all factors must be taken into account, and that under certain 
circumstances some factors outweigh others (cf. Zamir & Medina 2010: 52). Obviously, 
this is in line with the idea, developed in this series of essays, of the modal 
heterogeneity of value instantiation. 
More importantly, the modal account helps to address the problem of arbitrariness 
for threshold deontology, which is that it cannot provide a morally non-arbitrary 
account of why deontological constraints should have primacy at all when the threshold 
is not met, as well as of where to draw the threshold and why (cf. Ellis 1992; Alexander 
2000). For a sketch, recall the mathematical analogy I employed in the previous essay. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
foundation of morality, and that we should opt for c nsequentialism at the practical level but 
deontology (or more accurately, Kantianism the tenets of which include, for example, the 
conception of persons as free and equal moral beings) at the foundational level (cf. David 
Cummiskey [1996] and Shelly Kagan [2002] for arguments in support of the compatibility 
between consequentialism and Kantianism; moreover, as an variant of Kantianism, Rawls’s 
theory of justice has been characterized as “contracta i n-consequentialist” [Pogge 1995], 
indicating such compatibility). By the same token, I also agree with Philip Pettit (2012) on the 
inevitability of consequentialist assessments, at le st in the political realm. Thomas Pogge has 
similarly suggested that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to escape from 
consequentialism when adopting institutional perspectives on politics: “Once we view our 
social world institutionally, we will be drawn to a broadly consequentialist mode of assessment: 
an institutional scheme is just, or good, if it is on the whole better for the persons living under it 
than its alternatives would be” (Pogge 1995: 243). 
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Suppose, for the sake of argument, that value incommensurability does not hold and that 
we can assign commensurable “utilities” to (instantiations of) basic values so as to 
calibrate the overall “utility” of their tradeoff. Suppose further that, because of their 
distinctive modes of instantiation, only the utilities of some values could be assigned the 
role of exponents in the overall utility function of the tradeoff in a particular context, 
whereas others are, at most, part of the base in its operations of exponentiation. As a 
result, changes in the former certainly would have exponentially different impacts on 
the overall utility of the tradeoff than changes in the latter. 
In fact, those who are mathematically savvy can easily come up with many 
examples of functions that involve operations of exponentiation, in each of which the 
maximization of the overall utility requires that some values be assigned (ostensibly 
deontological) primacy over others, unless and until the utilities of the latter increase 
beyond certain thresholds. Moreover, by adjusting the value of each parameter in the 
overall utility function, in accordance with relevant information provided by the context, 
the thresholds at issue could also be determined. Finally, while value 
incommensurability makes the assignment of precise “utilities” to value instantiations 
impossible, it does not affect the takeaway from this analogy: different modes of value 
instantiation may lead to different roles and weights of relevant values in assessing their 
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conflicts and tradeoffs, in accordance with the nature of particular practical contexts. 
That said, incommensurability does imply that the tresholds for overriding those 
ostensibly deontological constraints are necessarily vague and fluid, subject to a greater 
degree of reasonable disagreement than many would have assumed. 
The demarcation of the frontiers of negative liberties, and their tradeoff with other 
important values, can be understood in this light, although a lot more details remain to 
be filled in. The ultimate reason for a sufficiently strong, but not too rigid, presumption 
in favor of access to a relatively extensive range of permissible choices and actions 
against state coercion lies, in a nutshell, in the special mode in which freedom 
instantiates, and accordingly the special mode of relevance it has in political, especially 
institutional, contexts of value conflict, as I have argued. This modal specialty allows us 
to construct a sphere of civil liberties as ostensibly deontological constraints, the 
thresholds for which to be overridden are sufficiently stringent but not prohibitive, and 
are reasonably fluid to accommodate variation in circumstances and judgments. 
Such variation, however, leads to further questions about the places of democracy 






Democracy and the Modal Dichotomy of Freedom 
While the term “liberal democracy” is widely circulated in contemporary political 
discourse, the alliance between liberalism and democracy has never been an easy one. 
Liberal theorists tend to have an ambivalent attitude towards democracy, welcoming 
and suspicious at once. On the one hand, most of them recognize democracy as valuable, 
either intrinsically or instrumentally. On the other hand, they are wary of its potential 
threat to core liberal values. Indeed, one of the greatest fears by contemporary liberal 
political theory, it is suggested, is “majority tyranny, a temptation to which otherwise 
decent democratic peoples have a long history of occasionally yielding” (Krause 2002: 
ix). Consequently, many liberals tend to hold that t e priority of the right to democratic 
participation is strictly lower than the priority of the access to “negative” civil liberties: 
the former is subject to restrictions constituted by the latter, not the other way around. 
This ambivalence towards democracy is perfectly exemplified in Berlin’s writings, 
where liberal pluralism was first espoused. To begin with, he (in)famously claimed that 
negative liberty “is not incompatible with some kinds of autocracy, or at any rate with 
the absence of self-government” (Berlin 2007: 176). Sometimes he also suggested that 
“the chief value for liberals of political – ‘positive’ – rights, of participating in the 
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government, is as a means for protecting what they hold to be an ultimate value, namely 
individual – ‘negative’ – liberty,” but that meanwhile democracy has a poor record of 
doing such job (Berlin 2007: 211, cf. 177, etc.). Accordingly, Jonathan Riley (2013) 
concluded that political democracy should not be included in Berlin’s idea of the 
“minimum of common moral ground,” from which only a sphere of negative liberty can 
be derived. 
Nonetheless, Berlin would later clarify that the right to democratic self-government, 
which he takes to be the “original meaning” of positive liberty,46 is not merely an 
                                                          
46 Many interpreters of Berlin would surely reject the suggestion that Berlin returned to this 
apparently Constantian idea of positive freedom as democracy. For example, while Crowder 
correctly rejected the myth that in Berlin’s thought t ere are multiple “genuine” conceptions of 
positive liberty, he (wrongly) argued that, for Berlin, “positive liberty in its original sense” 
(namely “self-mastery”) refers to “autonomy” rather than the right to democratic self-
government (Crowder 2004: 67-68). Granted, Crowder was also correct in calling out the notion 
of “freedom as political participation” as different from positive liberty (Crowder 2004: 67), as 
the former is supposedly more a so-called “exercise- oncept” than an “opportunity-concept.” 
But this merely points to another confusion in Berlin’s retreatment of the right to democracy. 
That is, Berlin sometimes lumped together such a right with the virtue (and perhaps the moral 
duty) of civic participation in political life. As a consequence, even in his later writings, Berlin 
conflated “freedom in the sense of self-government,” which should be the “genuine” form of 
positive liberty as he hesitantly acknowledged, on the one hand, with “the Aristotelian notion of 
true civic liberty” of “[performing] civic duties out of love for their polis, without needing to be 
coerced,” which, according to his earlier analyses, was one of the “distorted” versions of 
positive liberty, on the other hand (Berlin 2002: 33). For more on the right to democratic self-
government as (the “original” or “genuine” form of) positive freedom, as well as on Berlin’s 




instrumental value, but “a fundamental human need, something valuable in itself, 
whether or not it clashes with the claims of negative l berty or of any other goal” (Berlin 
2007: 39). Moreover, he argued, both negative and positive liberties are derived from 
the freedom to choose: 
 
those who have ever valued liberty for its own sake believed that to be free to 
choose, and not to be chosen for, is an inalienable ingredient in what makes 
human beings human; and that this underlies both the positive demand to have 
a voice in the laws and practices of the society in which one lives, and to be 
accorded an area, artificially carved out, if need b , in which one is one’s own 
master, a ‘negative’ area in which a man is not obliged to account for his 
activities to any man so far as this is compatible with the existence of 
organised society. (Berlin 2007: 52) 
 
In this passage lies the germ of what I call the dichotomization argument for democracy, 
which goes roughly as follows. In the context of a political society, there are always two 
parallel modes in which the value of the freedom to ch ose is to be instantiated. As a 
result, the liberal pluralist argument on the basis of the modal account for the 
presumption of negative liberties at the level of institutional arrangement is, mutatis 
mutandis, applicable to the institutionalization of positive liberty as well. The modal 
account of liberal pluralism, in other words, does not only justify liberalism, but also 
liberal democracy, despite the ineradicable tension between the “negative” and “positive” 
forms of freedom. 
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As I have argued in the first essay, both the parallelism and the tension between 
two modes of freedom arises from the fact that, when a multitude of agents cohabit the 
world, one’s choices and actions necessarily generate and impose externalities on others. 
A functioning society thus needs rules and procedurs of determining the boundaries of 
permissible choices and actions by each member of the society, so as to regulate the 
externalities of those choices and actions. If membrs of a society have a freedom-based 
interest in determining for themselves how to choose and act in their own lives (i.e. 
within the boundaries of permissible choices and actions), then they also have a 
freedom-based interest in playing a role in determining where to draw those boundaries 
and how to neutralize the externalities of other memb rs’ permissible choices and 
actions, as well as in shaping the rules and procedures of doing so. 
In other words, it is the fact that we live not in isolation but in a society that 
necessitates the parallel, dichotomized instantiation of freedom in two modes. On the 
one hand, it must be instantiated in our access to a relatively extensive sphere of 
permissible choices and actions, so as to effectively give shape to our lives in light of 
our own judgments. On the other hand, freedom is also instantiated in our access to 
participation in the process of collectively demarcating such a sphere. In other words, it 
is instantiated in our right to democratic self-government. 
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Furthermore, this parallelism implies that there is no determinate priority between 
the instantiation of negative and positive modes of freedom. Berlin sometimes seemed 
to suggest otherwise, however, even after he had conceded that negative liberties and 
the right to democratic self-government have a commn root in the freedom to choose. 
For example, in arguing that the protection of negative liberties does not “call for 
abdication by individuals or groups from democratic self-government of the society,” he 
reasoned that this is because “after their own nicely calculated corner” of negative 
liberties “has been made secure and fenced in against others,” all the rest could still be 
left “to the play of power politics” (Berlin 2007: 53, emphases added). That is, he 
equated “democratic self-government” with the mere “play of power politics,” which 
must not intrude in the “nicely calculated,” “secured and fenced” area of negative 
liberty. 
But the questions concerning the demarcation of the area of negative liberties once 
again come to the scene: how do we know the “corner” of negative liberties have been 
“nicely calculated”? Who is to judge whether it is time to contract the corner a bit, and 
where? Letting each member of the society draw the boundaries of her own – but not 
others’ – negative liberties certainly does not work; authoritative, enforceable collective 
decisions are needed. But if those decisions are left ntirely to the hands of the elite or 
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statesmen who supposedly are vested with “knowledge and skills,” does it not deprive 
ordinary citizens of their “voice in the laws and practices of the society in which one 
lives,” which, after all, is not only “a fundamental human need,” but also an inevitable 
practical instantiation of one’s freedom of choice, just as negative liberties are? Given 
the modal dichotomy of freedom, the idea that the boundaries of negative liberties 
should be determined before the process of democratic participation begins is a non-
starter. 
At the end of the day, the tension between negative nd positive forms of freedom 
should be recognized as immanent to its distinctive mode of dichotomized instantiation, 
so long as we live in societies rather than in isolati n. It is an ineradicable dimension of 
the dynamic of liberal democracy, a dynamic that value pluralists have reason to cherish, 
than to decry. 
 
Political Judgment, Institutional Design, and Statesp rsonship 
The dichotomization argument for democracy, presented above, does not imply 
that non-democratic forms of decision-making should have no place at all in liberal 
political theory, however. Quite to the contrary, the modal account of liberal pluralism 
suggests we appreciate the contentious yet indispensibl  role of political judgment in 
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democratic life, and attend to the normative theorizing of its implications, both on 
institutional design and on the ethics of political action. 
As I have argued, given value incommensurability, the rational adjudication of 
value conflict requires the making of “every effort” to acquire and apply “knowledge 
and skill” (Berlin 2007: 42) and to reflect carefully and thoroughly, in each particular 
practical case, in search for either a definite soluti n or a proof that no such solution 
exists, without knowing a priori that either such solution or such proof of insolvability 
exists. This, of course, is a tough task, and value pluralists generally agree on the 
indispensability of the faculty of judgment in this process of practical reasoning, 
frequently likening it to the Aristotelian notion of phronēsis, or practical wisdom, as 
something that makes it possible that, “[p]rovided one has taken the process of practical 
justification as far as it will go in the course of arriving at the conflict, one may be able 
to proceed without further justification, but without irrationality either” (Nagel 1979: 
135; cf. Berlin 1996; Crowder 2004: 141). 
Most value pluralists, nevertheless, have focused on the role of judgment or 
practical wisdom at the personal, instead of the political, level. That is, they talk mostly 
about individuals’ cultivation of the “skill [of judgment] in practical reasoning, refined 
against a background of other virtues or dispositions of character which together 
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contribute to a good life overall” (Crowder 2004: 141, emphasis added). Implicitly, 
judgment is seen as essentially a private matter, a me ns for someone to pursue and 
acquire “a good life,” or eudaimonia in the Aristotelian sense. 
But if the rational adjudication of value conflict is a permanent challenge not only 
in personal life but also in political life, then iaddition to the Aristotelian practical 
wisdom in living a good (personal) life, we must take political judgment seriously as 
well, making the best of it in the process of collective decision-making. 
Some might think that the question of political judgment has been exhausted by the 
above argument for democracy. After all, every citizen has her own judgments about 
political matters, and what else can we do when different citizens’ judgments on a 
certain political issue come into conflict with one another, other than resort to the 
democratic process of voicing, debating and counting their judgments? And isn’t 
democratic self-government, as I myself have argued, the positive instantiation of the 
freedom to choose, a fundamental human value? Introducing any non-democratic form 
of judgment into political decision-making, and, what’s worse, superimposing a 
judgment of this kind on the outcome of democratic judgments, it might seems, would 
imperil the very value of freedom in its positive mode. 
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There are several confusions involved in this thought, however, including the 
confusion between democratic as a source of political legitimacy, on the one hand, and 
democracy as a bearer of epistemic virtue, on the other hand, as well as the confusion 
between the introduction of a non-democratic judgment as an embodiment of ultimate 
authority, on the one hand, and as a form of hedging, on the other hand. To begin with, 
as has been argued, the claim of democratic self-government may sometimes clash with 
the demand for a more extensive sphere of negative liberties, whereas both of them may 
sometimes clash with basic human values other than t e freedom to choose. When an 
argument that a given democratic decision has unreasonably undermined certain other 
basic values is presented, it would be circular to esort to the very authority, whose 
sense of judgment is (at least implicitly) under question by this argument, to decide 
upon its validity. 
To be sure, this circularity cannot be resolved by the introduction of any other form 
of political authority, as judgments made by the latter could also be subject to 
questioning. But given how difficult and contentious the rational adjudication of value 
conflict is, the diversification of forms and sites of political decision-making helps 
hedge against the risk of irrational adjudication in political life, by opening up 
additional dimensions on which knowledge and skill relevant to a particular case can be 
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introduced, and by raising the bar for each particular political judgment, whether 
democratic or non-democratic, to go uncontested, given that any judgment is potentially 
wrong (or right, for that matter). 
Accordingly, there are two main ways in which non-democratic forms of political 
judgment can be institutionalized, in order to hedge against wrong democratic 
judgments in particular cases, as well as against the risks generated by each other.47 One 
is to establish various sites of expertise in relevant cases, such as courts with regard to 
legal matters, scientific agencies and advisory boards in relation to policies involving 
highly specialized scientific and technological issue  (e.g. FDA regarding the safety 
regulation of medical products). The other is to install a proper mechanism of checks 
and balances, such as a system of judicial review, so that none of the political 
authorities could overreach too easily in particular judgments, at the cost of certain 
basic values. 
                                                          
47 To be sure, there might be other institutional approaches to addressing the problem of wrong 
democratic judgments. For example, according to one interpretation, Jeremy Bentham espoused 
the kind of institutional design “that would induce ordinary people to act in socially desirable 
ways” by fostering certain requisite “moral, intellectual, or active aptitudes” in all citizens 
(Elster 2013: 189). The focus of this Benthamite approach to institutional design is, however, on 
preventing democratic judgments from going wrong, rather than on hedging against hem in 
case they go wrong. The former can be done by improving the quality of democratic judgments 
insofar as it is possible, whereas the latter can be done only by introducing non-democratic 
judgments as potential counterbalances. 
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Does the institutionalization of non-democratic forms of political judgment imperil 
the value of democratic self-government as positive fre dom, then? It does not, if the 
introduction of those institutions is democratically sanctioned, and is subject to possible 
democratic review and reversal in the future. In this way, democratic self-government is 
affirmed as the ultimate source of political legitimacy, provided that the (democratically 
sanctioned) threshold for triggering such review or reversal in relevant cases is not too 
high to make it practically impossible. 
On the other hand, however, the threshold should not be too low either. Otherwise 
if non-democratic judgments are too easy to overrid, their intended hedging will be 
rendered inefficacious. In other words, the real question becomes that of determining 
appropriate thresholds for triggering democratic review and reversal of non-democratic 
judgments. Notice that this question is akin to thepr viously discussed question of 
determining appropriate thresholds for trading off civil liberties for the sake of other 
important social goods, except that the former question is self-referential in a way the 
latter is not. Both kinds of thresholds should ultimately be drawn by the democratic 
people, but in deciding upon the thresholds for triggering democratic review and 
reversal, what the democratic people does is limit the role its political judgment plays in 
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particular policy issues by invoking its political judgment at the level of institutional 
design. 
Finally, the indispensability of political judgment has non-institutional implications 
as well. For one thing, the requirement to acquire and apply knowledge and skill with 
every effort in relevant cases in order to resolve value conflict in political life suggests 
both an obligation and a type of virtuous character for political actors, especially for 
those actors in a position of exercising great political authority or influence. The virtue  
is the acquisition of relevant knowledge and skill to particular political issues, as well as 
the ability, willingness and determination to apply such knowledge and skill, despite 
personal consequences. The obligation is to live up to the ideal set by this virtue. 
Call it the ideal of statespersonship.48 A statesperson is one who is in a position of 
exercising great political authority or influence, makes every effort to acquire and apply 
knowledge and skill relevant to particular political issues, and arrives at insightful (if 
not always correct) political judgments in relevant cases. She respects democratic 
legitimacy, and defers to the democratic judgment when doing so is instructed by 
relevant institutions. But she is also willing to act in defiance of the public opinion that 
has not yet translated into institutionally sanctioned democratic decision, provided that 
                                                          
48 Thus Berlin’s (2001) interest in portraying the (supposed) statesmen of his time is justified. 
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she has made every effort to acquire and apply relevant knowledge and skill in reaching 
her considered political judgment on the matter, as well as reasonable effort to 
communicate with, and to convince, the public. In doing so, moreover, the statesperson 
acknowledges that even her carefully considered judgment may err, and she is willing to 
submit herself to public scrutiny, and to take the blame for any consequence of her 
judgments and subsequent actions. According to the modal account of liberal pluralism, 
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